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Abstract

Following the fall of the Soviet Union in 1991, a new name appeared on the map of
Europe- Ukraine. No longer simply the borderland of the empires of Europe, Ukraine
was now a sovereign nation. Traditional literature argues that to craft and maintain a
nation requires a nation-building identity, a solid understanding of who

is the in-group

and who is the out-group; such an identity has not coalesced in the two decades of an
independent Ukraine. This thesis analyses the interplay between democratic
consolidation, both institutionally and culturally, economic development, and identity
volatility in Ukraine through the lens of the three major eras in its brief history: the

Post-Communist decade, the Orange Revolution, and the post-Orange period. It finds
that because identity and political preferences are so tightly entwined, the lack of
identity cohesion in Ukraine exacerbates the political and economic volatility of the
nation; however, unless the incentives for Ukrainian elites both domestically and

abroad shift dramatically, this issue will not be resolved.
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Chapter One: Introduction
Since the advent of modern political theory, much time has been devoted to
analyzing the relationship between political actors, elected officials and bureaucrats, on
one hand and economic actors, businesses and consumers, on the other. Following the
meteoric rise of the United States in terms of geopolitical power in the first half of the
twentieth century, a new generation of theorists, emboldened by the “inherent” benefits
of democracy over authoritarian regimes and free markets over centralized, planned
economies, began evaluating the link between democratic systems and economic
growth. Political scientists like Samuel Huntington and economists such as Milton
Friedman posited that the only way for a nation, particularly a developing nation, to

prosper was through a free-market economy supported yet unhindered by a stable
democratic government. Of course, the very nature of the Soviet Union presented a

strong alternative to this Western school of thought, albeit one Western scholars
believed to be intrinsically flawed. As long as the Soviet Union remained intact, the
ideological hegemony of democratic and free market principles continued to be
challenged.
The official fall of the Soviet Union in 1991 and its dissolution into myriad new
sovereign states created concerns of legitimacy and stability in Eastern Europe of both a
practical and ideological nature. These issues have plagued the region, most especially
Ukraine, into the present day and have wide-ranging consequences for the future. The
collapse of communism created a political and economic void which Western theorists
and policy makers could fill with democracy and free trade, which they believed to bea
surefire route to development and growth. Consequently, the former Soviet republics
1

experienced a drastic top-down ideological shift. In some nations, this ideational shift

has had beneficial results, propelling them over the past two decades into the elite club
of “Western” democracies. In others, such as Ukraine, however, the massive

institutional disintegration at the national and international scale led to the
fragmenting of space economies, an occurrence compounded by the rise of regionalism
and localism. These factors have combined to create a volatile economy characterized

by boom/bust cycles and a political system rife with nepotism, clientelistic
relationships and an utter lack of consolidation of the rule of law. This thesis will
attempt to analyze why these traits continue, over twenty years after independence, to
dominate the political, economic and social life of Ukraine through a comparison of
economic events, political turmoil, and national identity development. It is the position
of this author that the protracted nature of cohesive identity building in Ukraine, and
the disincentives for political elites to create such a national identity, that has led to the
economic and political volatility experienced in Ukraine since 1991.
In order to analyze the interactions between these three spheres, it is critical to
understand how economists believe citizen preferences should get translated into
policy. In the literature on public finance, there is much discussion of public choice,
namely how to provide the populace with an appropriate level of public goods.
However, if we assume that citizens are unique individuals with idiosyncratic

consumption desires, both of public and private goods, it is difficult to know what the
public’s choice might be. Public finance economists believe when this is the case,

majority elections are the only way to truly identify what the public desires!. In such a
polarized nation as Ukraine, therefore, effective elections that lead to policy change is
critical to the long-term success of the economy. Unfortunately, that same polarity

exacerbates and hinders the electoral and policymaking processes by creating an
environment wherein power politics and nepotism are incentivized.
The

Neoliberal Growth Model and Democratization in the Post-Communist Era

The path towards the now commonly held belief that high levels of economic
growth and democracy are mutually inclusive began in the 1930s when Paul
Rosenstein-Rodan started noticing differences in the labor supplies between poor and
rich nations. He posited that the problems of labor surpluses and lack of capital in poor
nations dovetailed to the labor shortages and capital surpluses in rich nations in a very

specific way; Rosenstein-Rodan believed that the only way to stabilize these inequities
at equilibrium was through labor migration. However, he concluded that the market
could not be relied on to solve this problem by itself, due to externality issues, and so an
external body must be formed to encourage this migration.2 The economic and
demographic devastation of World War II in Europe only exacerbated these
inequalities. Previously, the European nations, and to some extent America, had been

considered the rich nations. After the end of World War II, the only country in the world
that retained that status was the United States. The establishment of the Bretton Woods

1 Faith, Roger L. And James M. Buchanan. “Towards a Theory of Yes-No Voting.” In The Theory of Public
Choice: II, ed. James Buchanan (University of Michigan Press: 1984): 90-104.
* Dos Santos, Raul Cristobau. “The Theory of Economic Development and Neo-Liberalism.” Compilation of
Programas de Seminarios Academicos at the University of Sao Paolo. 2004.
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system in 1944, which created both the IMF and IBRD, soon became that external force
Robenstein-Rodan had envisioned3.

The interplay between this monetary system and government structure started
in large part as a response to the perceived threat of the Soviet Union. The Democratic
Peace Theory, which was first posited in the late-18t century, cycled back into favor in
the mid-1950s. It argued that as democratic nations did not go to war against one
another, and prosperous nations were for the large part democracies. Thus, with the
threat of Soviet aggression looming over their heads, American policymakers had a

vested interest in ensuring a lack of hostility from other sources. While the causal
relationship between prosperity and democracy was still unknown, the simplest way to
spread peace that appeared to be to promote prosperity‘. Since the two funds
mentioned above were largely paid for with American coin, they came with certain
strings attached. Democratic nations, or at the least those who were not communist
sympathizers, were the ones most likely to find themselves receiving aid. However, the
threat of communism was considered so critical to American foreign policy that both
Greece and Turkey, two non-democratic nations, were among the first to secure
Marshall Plan funding through their promise to use those funds to fight communist
insurgents.

In addition, this aid also held economic restrictions; nations could not

simply borrow the money to do with it whatever they liked. Rather, the IMF and later
the World Bank insisted that the money be used for market restructuring, which often

> Rosenstein-Rodan, Paul Narziss. "International aid for underdeveloped countries." The Review of
Economics and Statistics 43, no. 2 (1961): 107-138.
“ Russett, Bruce, Christopher Layne, David E. Spiro, and Michael W. Doyle. "The democratic
peace." /nternational Security 19, no. 4 (1995): 164-184.
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meant abolishing the protections of systems such as ISI, import substitution
industrialization, in favor of open trade with few to no tariffs or quotas, open labor
migration, and lessened government interference in the market. By the end of the Soviet
Union, this relationship between democracy and growth was so commonly held that it
seemed only natural that the abolishment of the Communist system and a transition to
democracy (and therefore neoliberal markets) would inherently lead to growth and
prosperity.

The

hopes

for an

economically

thriving

Central

and

Eastern

Europe

have

experienced mixed results at best in the past twenty years. Estonia, one of the nations
which

opted

for a quick

transition

to free

markets

and

democracy,

faced

strong

economic backlash in the first five years after independence. Its GNI per capita dropped

nearly 3,000 dollars between 1990 and 1995, from $10, 075 to $7,769. However, the
determination of Estonian policymakers to keep to this plan of “shock therapy” seemed
to pay off over the following decade. As of 2011, Estonia’s GNI per capita had risen to
$16,799,

and

it was

one of the nations

least affected by the 2008

global

banking

collapse. On the other hand, Ukraine took a slower path to neoliberalism, gradually
opening its economy and reducing its protections. The result has been a nation that is in
many ways not much better off than it was twenty years ago, if at all. GNI per capita in
2011 was actually $2,000 less than it was in 1990, a clear sign that the economic growth

Ukraine hoped for has not happened. Many political and economic scholars would point
to Ukraine’s slow transition to liberal economics as the reason for its stagnation. They
would

prescribe

deeper,

more

drastic

reforms,

a

policy

choice

that

would

be

exceptionally divisive in Ukraine’s volatile political climate. Indeed, this gradual reform
5

may indeed be to blame for some of Ukraine’s current economic woes. However, this
thesis asserts that the cause is not entirely so clear. Rather, a variable overlooked by the
current research, namely the escalation of the centuries-old Ukrainian identity conflict
following independence and perceptions of it by the two regional hegemons
and

Russia),

is vital

to understanding

Ukraine’s

economic

(the EU

volatility and _ political

retardation and to affecting any changes to that status quo.
The Importance of Self-Identification

Historically, Ukraine has been characterized by an uncertain political identity,
sitting unstably on the precipice between East and West, though never fully being
either. Its unique political relationship to both tsarist Russia and the Soviet Union
created a split of political ideologies between those who envision Ukraine as being
Russian for all practical purposes and those who view it as a European nation being
held back by its ties to the East. While a similar split has been seen to a lesser extent in
other former Soviet republics, it has been central to the development of political and
economic relations in Ukraine in a manner unrivaled by any of its counterparts. One
telling example of this is the evolution of the Ukrainian language itself, whose path to
legitimacy, both under the law and in popular opinion, is closely connected to Ukraine’s
relations with the Soviet Union. In many ways, a national language is one the truest
expressions ofa national identity. With even their language being subjugated by
Russian projections of their identity, it is hardly surprising that Ukrainians find
themselves in a conflict of identity. This rift has only been exacerbated in the years
since independence as its fledgling democracy has struggled to cope with the pressures
of the global market and of post-Communism.

Identity and the Orange Revolution
The identity divide in Ukraine is critical not only to understanding the nation’s

past but also its future. Ukraine’s factionalist past met its uncertain future during the
2004 Orange Revolution. Beginning as a response to election fraud and quickly
escalating to a mass movement against corruption and authoritarian practices and for
democracy and reform, the Orange Revolution offered a watershed moment wherein

one or the other of the paths of Ukrainian political identity could have been chosen.
However, in many ways, it has proven to be a bit ofa lost opportunity, exacerbating the
factions rather than reconciling them. In many ways an urban revolution, it resonated
with Ukrainians who viewed themselves as more Western. However, its popularity

among urbanites prejudiced rural Ukrainians, who hold a more traditional Russianbased identity, against the movement and its aims. In addition to the urban-rural divide,

the revolution also had a divisive geographic element. Eastern and Southern Ukrainians
view the events of Orange very differently than Central and Western Ukrainians, which
will be furthered discussed in Chapter Three. Without national unity on the subject of
and need for reform, both political and economic, the Orange Revolution could not ful fill
its goals. If economic growth is to be achieved within this generation in Ukraine, the
two conflicting halves of Ukrainian identity must be reconciled to a common purpose,
the consolidation ofa democratic system, as “the political schism...is as much about
identity as it is about economic system and political structure.” 5

5 Light, Margot, Stephen White, and John Lowenhardt. “A Wider Europe: the View from
International Affairs 76, no.1 (2000): 77-88.

Moscow and Kyiv.”

External Identity Perception as a Challenge to Growth

The European Union is undeniably one of the most important forces at work in
Europe today. An organization that is integrated to a degree unimaginable even fifty
years ago, the EU in many ways dictates the future of Europe and her nations. Thus,

while national self-identification is important, it does not explain everything. Important
to consider are the EU’s perceptions of those nation’s identities. As stated above, it is
difficult for an individual to conceive a picture ofa nation’s identity without coloring it

with subjection beliefs, a situation only exacerbated when that picture is being created
by diplomats all across Europe. From the beginning, the EU has had an attitude of panEuropeanism, only considering expansion to those nations considered to truly share
that European culture for fear that expanding into non- or quasi-European nations will
dilute their European values. While the limits of this attitude have been readjusted over
the years, including for the latest expansion into Southern Europe, how the EU sees a
potential member state is key.
The divergent policies with respect to Estonia and Ukraine are a clear example of
the prejudice and preconceptions that color EU politics. Estonia is already a member

state of the EU and is one of the 17 member states that utilize the euro as its official
currency. Thus, policy actions towards Estonia by the EU are favorable and welcoming.
This is not so for Ukraine, which is not a member of the EU and does not appear likely to
advance to membership any time in the near future, despite the ‘advance’ the European
Neighborhood Act in 2005 is supposed to represent. This difference in policy action is
deliberate, a consequence due to the perception of Estonia’s ‘European-ness’. The EU
has always had a strained relationship with Russia, both before and after 1991, and

thus views the Russian elements of Ukraine’s identity to be a detriment to the
Europeanism of the Union.
The 2008 Global Financial Crisis
The banking collapse of 2008 and the sovereign debt crisis that followed have
become major obstacles to policy-making in the European Union. In addition, Ukraine’s
unstable economy was among the worst hit. The economic collapse of the PIIGS nations
has led many to question the benefits of the Eurozone and the current high level of
integration present in the organization. The economic collapse could provide a catalyst

for the unification of Ukrainian identity politics and consequently democratic
consolidation, as dire economic circumstances force Ukrainians to find common

ground. However, the protective policies implemented by both the EU and Ukraine in
response to the crisis, including slowing the potential membership of some nations,
could lead to increased tension between Ukraine’s domestic factions, postponing or
even negating the possible unifying effects of this period of uncertainty. If, however,
strides toward unification can be made that cause a simultaneous transformation of EU
perceptions of Ukraine, and consequently its policies towards Ukraine, democratic
consolidation and economic development may be achieved.
Ukraine's Historical Legacy
In order to understand the impact and significance of the institutional choices
made by Ukrainian elites following independence, an examination of the institutions left
on the ground after the dissolution of the Soviet system must be undertaken. The
institutional choices made in the early 1990s are all either reactions against or
protections of institutions left to them by the Soviets.

The Shelest Years 1963-1972
Despite its temporary relegation out of the sphere of political discourse

following the Second World War, the national issue never fully passed out of public
consciousness, in spite of Soviet Russia’s best attempts to imbibe Ukrainians with
“Soviet identity instead of Soviet Ukrainian identity”. Under First Secretary Petro
Shelest, this issue was not only brought back into the national dialogue, it was tacitly

and even openly supported. Shelest self-identified with Ukrainian national values and
hoped to arrange a compromise between the Party and the nationalistic elites. Ina
speech he gave to the Fifth Congress of the Ukrainian Writers’ Union, Shelest called on

the Union to support and develop the Ukrainian language and culture throughout the
country. He called on Ukrainians to use their native language in the workplace and at
home and encouraged a revival of the study of Ukrainian history, a practice all but
eradicated when the Soviets constructed their myths of Russian-Ukrainian historic
brotherhood and inevitable union. However, Shelest had never had particularly positive
relations with Soviet Premier Leonid Brezhnev, who saw Shelest’s nationalist leanings
as a betrayal of the party. Using Shelest’s book, Ukraino Nasha Rodianska (Our Soviet
Ukraine), published in 1970 as a catalyst, Brezhnev and his political cohort the
Dnepropetrovsk Group had Shelest ousted from power and subsequently accused of
“ideological errors and biased evaluation of important historical events”.”? Brezhnev
knew he could not allow this nationalist sentiment to grow deep roots in Ukraine

* Rusnachenko, Anatoliy. "Ukraine from the mid-1950s to the mid-1980s: The Second among Equals or a

Colony of the Empire?." LATVIJA UN AUSTRUMEIROPA 20. GADSIMTA 60.-80. GADOS (2007): 193. pp. 195.
7 Rusnachenko, Anatoliy. "Ukraine from the mid-1950s to the mid-1980s: The Second among Equals ora
Colony of the Empire?." LATVIJA UN AUSTRUMEIROPA 20. GADSIMTA 60.-80. GADOS (2007): 193. pp. 197.
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without political ramifications, and so he used the disgrace of Shelest to convey the

official Soviet position on the historical values that underpin Ukrainian nationalism.
The Shcherbyts’kyi Years (1972-1989)

In order to further consolidate the destruction of Ukrainian nationalism,
Brezhnev had Volodymyr Shcherbyts’kyi appointed the next First Secretary of the CPU
(Communist Party of Ukraine). A party hard-liner with deep ties to Moscow,
Shcherbyts’kyi appointed someone with similarly Moscow-oriented political beliefs,
Valentin Malanchuk, to the post of ideological secretary of the CPU. This appointment
would set the tone for Shcherbyts’kyi’s time in power. In his own words, “To be an
internationalist means to express feelings of friendship and brotherhood towards all

people of our country and, first of all, towards the great Russian people, their culture,
their language.....to lead an uncompromising struggle against nationalism” (emphasis
mine). 8 In 1959, a law was passed that allowed individual parents to choose the
language in which their child would be educated, allowing Russophile parents to pass
their language on to their children. This led to an intense Russification of education and
eventually of academia and the workplace. By the time of Shcherbyts’kyi’s regime, an
entire generation of Ukrainian natives had been socialized and oriented with no sense
of “national Ukrainian values”; as the Soviets had hoped, they had eradicated most
traces of Ukrainian nationalism. In addition, in almost direct contrast to the events of

the early 1930s, Ukrainian becomes considered a provincial language by most of the
people. During the 1970s and 1980s, many Ukrainians moved into cities, leading to the
start ofa slow death for the Ukrainian language. In addition, urbanization lead to
* Rusnachenko, Anatoliy. "Ukraine from the mid-1950s to the mid-1980s: The Second among Equals ora
Colony of the Empire?." LATVIJA UN AUSTRUMEIROPA 20. GADSIMTA
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60.-80. GADOS (2007): 193. pp. 197.

competition between Ukrainians and Russians for jobs and housing as cities become
increasing Russified. The legacy of these changes continues to be reflected in a very

substantive way in modern Ukraine, yet another complicating factor to the
institutionalization of democratic reforms there.

Purposes, Aims, and Motivations

The intended goal of this thesis is a substantive analysis of the relationship
between democratic consolidation and economic performance in post-independence
Ukraine, an era that has been characterized by rampant stagnation and political
uncertainty. This thesis will attempt to discover whether consolidating the fragile
Ukrainian democracy will in turn stabilize and develop its economy orif the nation’s
high levels of economic volatility have been caused by something else entirely, namely a
factionalized identity. To that end, several research questions will be posited. Can
Western democracy and free-market policies prove to be the panacea of Ukrainian
growth, albeit twenty years slower than many of its East European counterparts, as the

democratic fervor and push for consolidation of Western ideals embodied by the
Orange Revolution would suggest? Or, conversely, does the current more authoritarian
path of Ukrainian policy pursued under President Yanukovych represent not only a
more accurate portrayal of the nature of contemporary Ukrainian sociopolitical thought
but also the path for future economic growth and consolidation in Ukraine? How does
this split in Ukrainian political identity impact the chances of democratic consolidation?
Could the effects of the global financial crisis finally solidify the goals of the Orange
Revolution by uniting Ukrainians in a push for democracy?

Finally, has the perception

of Ukrainian identity as somehow more Russian than European impacted the European

12

Union’s policies and attitudes toward Ukraine since independence and how have these
policies impacted the pattern of transition experienced in Ukraine?
Methodology
This thesis will attempt to unravel the complicated interaction between
economic growth, democratic consolidation, and identity formation. To this end,
economic growth patterns, at both the aggregate and regional (oblast) level will be
examined. Democratic consolidation will be examined using institutional changes made
to the Constitution of Ukraine over the course of the past two decades and their
potential for subversion by those in power. Identity is, of course, the hardest variable to

tease out, as any attempts inherently contain author bias. While an imperfect measure,
this research uses parliamentary voting data by oblast as the indicator of identity. This

is an acceptable indirect indicator because the political parties and blocs take very
divergent stances on what it means to be Ukrainian and on which continent (or both)
Ukraine’s future lies. Thus, to vote for a particular party is tantamount to selfidentification. Changing trends in both the makeup and the consolidation of party

power in the Verkhovna Rada will be used to understand changing identity trends in
Ukraine. Of course, no region is uniform, and for that reason, the charts in the

appendices list the top three parties by vote percentage for the each election.
Brief Literature Review and Contributions to Current Research
The vast majority of the current literature focusing on Ukraine concerns itself
primarily with the economic sphere alone. Prolific Ukrainian scholars Adam Swain and

Vlad Mykhnenko illustrate how the economic activity centers in Ukraine are borrowed
from the Soviets, creating a “space-economy which was amongst the most imbalanced
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in Europe” which was only exacerbated by “post-Soviet regional trajectories”.° Ina
related article, Adrian Smith and John Pickles show that the transition to neo-liberalism

has only increased the regionalism of the Ukrainian economy. Using the example of the
European garment industry, they demonstrate that the outsourcing of certain

production tasks has furthered the regional isolation of the Ukrainian economy.!° This
insight is important because it reveals one of the many causes of Ukraine’s identity

factionalism. Regions that were prosperous under the Soviets and now have fallen into
decay would hardly be inclined to view themselves as pro-reform and pro-Europe; on
the other hand, regions that now benefit from increased trade may take an alternate
view. Creating a more unified space-economy in Ukraine could be one important aspect
of economic growth and democratic reform.

In terms of Ukraine’s political and social state, the research as it relates to a noneconomic causal factor for the current situation is slim. However, Tamila Karpyk’s
insightful analysis of democratization theory in Ukraine and Poland provides a solid
foundation. She argues that it is incorrect to say that some nations simply failed at the
democracy project following the dissolution of the USSR. Rather, she posits that “there
were differences in the resources and obstacles to democratization in both countries.
These differences influence the length of transition even after the apparent decline of
authoritarian regime. Therefore, I agree that there is “no single road to democratic

° Myknenko, Vlad & Adam Swain. “Ukraine’s Diverging Space-Economy: The Orange Revolution, PostSoviet Development Models, and Regional Trajectories.” European Urban and Regional Studies. 12 Nov
2009.
10 Smith, et. al 2008. “Reconfiguring ‘Post-Socialist’ Regions.”

14

politics, especially if we allow ourselves to recognize fast versus slower transitions.”!!
From here the leap could easily be made that identity is one of those differences that
can alter the length of transition. In a similar vein, Stephan Shulman provides a level of
depth to the identity divide in Ukraine with his labels of an “Eastern Slavic national
identity complex” and an “Ethnic Ukrainian national identity complex”, which his essay
argues is the reason “independent Ukraine has made great progress in neither
democratization nor marketization”. 12 Shulman’s label capture more of the nuances of
the identity divide than the rest of the literature, and thus it is those labels that will be

utilized when referring to different groups throughout this thesis.
While the current research advances our understanding of Ukraine and its

prospects for the future in small, detailed ways, not much research has been done that
attempts to combine all three spheres of import: economic, political, and social. In many
ways, that is the ambition of this thesis- to provide a complete and holistic perspective
of the problems plaguing Ukraine’s path to growth and offer nuanced ways to alleviate
these concerns. There is, of course, no way a full picture of Ukraine’s present and future
can be encapsulated in this brief thesis. However, it is my hope that this research will
provide a foundation from which further interdisciplinary study can be conducted.

* Karpyk, Tamila. “Transition Toward Democracy: Test of Democratization Theory in the Cases of
Ukraine and Poland.” Dalhousie EUCE Graduate Papers. 2009
12 Shulman, Steven. “National Identity and Public Support for Political and Economic Reform in Ukraine.”
Slavic Review, 2005.
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Chapter Two: From Transition to Turmoil
In order to more accurately fit the theoretical framework proposed in the
previous chapter to the unique case of Ukraine, a thorough understanding of the
historical origins of the state’s current iteration must be had. The historical processes
by which a nation arrives at its contemporary are complex and multi-faced at best; ina
multi-ethnic, multi-lingual nation with divisive regional characteristics, such as Ukraine,

they are labyrinthine and frequently contentious. Ukraine, historically, has always been
a divided nation; “from the mid-seventeenth century to the 1773 partition of Poland the
region was divided between Poland and Russia, from partition until the First World
War between Russia and Austria, and from the First World War until the Second,
between Poland, Russia, Romania, and Czecholovakia”.!3 This historical division,

characterized by the sense of always being someone’s border but never a bordered,
unified region in its own right, impacted not only the road to transition, but also the
type of government people sought when their voices began to matter. This chapter will
argue that despite changes in both regime type and market type, the trappings of
government, if you will, substantial change was not institutionalized into the Ukrainian
system. This failure of institutionalization occurred because the substance of Ukraine
did not change, namely the identity of both the masses and the elites as expressed
through their political preferences. Thus, the decade of post-Communism in Ukraine
was at best the success of electoral democracy and at worst simply a layering of the old
political machine on top of the new institutions of government.

13 Reid, Anna. “European Union Expansion and Ukraine: Borderland.” The World Today. April 2004. pp.
11.
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The Grand Nation-Building Idea?

National Movements and Transition Politics
As stated in chapter one, opposition movements existed in Ukraine throughout

the Soviet period although they were quickly and harshly repressed by the CPU.
However, Gorbachev's reforms of perestroika and glasnost’ opened the system up just
enough that opposition movements could begin to gain a foothold. Starting in 1987,
dozens of small ‘fronts’ or ‘unions’ began to develop throughout Ukraine, most

importantly the Ukrainian Helsinki Union (UHU), the Ukrainian Culturological Club, and
the student-led Hromada. The Chernobyl’ explosion also led to the creation of ‘green
unions’ that would come to join the opposition. At first, these groups were small and
ephemeral, existing more solidly through their pamphlets then they did in actuality.
However, over the course of late 1988 to 1989, they began to build alliances, crafting

what would eventually become the united opposition, strengthened by the mass
inclusion of workers following unofficial strikes in mid-1989.
The second half of 1989 was characterized by the coalescing of the opposition
movement, although a true multi-party system failed to emerge due to the amount of
power still held by the CPU. However, their power structure suffered three major
setbacks in September of 1989 as Shcherbyts’kyi resigned, the Ukrainian Catholics
began to meet en masse, and Rukh (a key opposition coalition) held its first congress.
These advancements made the opposition feel as though a transition to multi-partyism
was a foregone conclusion; however, their inability to consolidate power after the 1990
elections gave the national communists an opportunity to attempt to regain power
through the August coup of 1991 in Moscow. Fortunately, sufficient power had been
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decentralized to the republics and the Ukrainian opposition was united enough that the
coup came too late to change the future of Ukraine. !4
Challenges during the Transition and Beyond
Following the failed August coup, Ukraine set about in earnest to the job of
establishing institutions. Despite a severe need to restructure the economic system,
Ukraine’s political elites, many of them former CPU leaders, opted to first consolidate

the state through political and military institutions.!5 Opting for a presidentialparliamentary system with proportional representation elections was the easy part of
negotiating, as it reflected the elites’ desire to appear less Soviet and more autonomous.

They knew, of course, that years of Soviet rule had left Ukraine with a system optimal to
autocratic consolidation and regime insularity, providing them with continued outlets
to subvert true change and maintain power. The Soviet legacy was a system that defied
the coalescing of democratic political control and precipitated what is known as
authoritarian regime competitiveness. “Competitive politics were rooted much less in
robust civil societies, strong democratic institutions, or democratic leadership than in
the inability of incumbents to maintain power or concentrate political control by
preserving elite unity, controlling elections and the media, and/or using force against
opponents.”!¢ Formulating an opposition and creating a nominal multi-party democracy
would prove to be the easier task in comparison to the mammoth challenge of
dismantling the structures that tacitly supported the authoritarianism of the former
“ Kuzio, Taras and Andrew Wilson. Ukraine: From Perestroika to Independence. St. Martin’s Press, 1994.
15 Ibid.
16 Way, Lucan. “Authoritarian State Building and the Sources of Regime Competitiveness in the Fourth
Wave: The Cases of Belarus, Moldova, Russia, and Ukraine.” World Politics 57, no.2 (2005): 231-261.
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regime, primarily because none of the elites, nor a majority of civilians, wanted it
destroyed. The process of transitions occurred in two broad categories, institutions that
built democracy and the state and nation-building institutions, both of which faced
challenges and produced consequences critical to the future of the state.
Institutions that Build Democracy
Subscribing to the belief that inadequate military forces was the reason the
formation ofa Ukrainian state failed in the early 20 century, political elites sought to
create a Ukrainian armed forces through a two-year plan, consolidating the state’s
monopoly on violence. Defense concerns were critical to the construction of anew
state; without the ability to protect its citizens and patrol its borders, the Ukrainian
state did not truly exist. Simultaneously, the leaders of Ukraine’s newly created political
parties began to work on the framework of a Constitution, an effort which would
continue until 1996. In this Constitution, a semi-presidential system was established.

While the duties of the president follow the traditions of older democracies, his powers
were much greater. To begin with, the president does not belong to the executive
branch as in other presidential systems; rather, he is meant to be the embodiment of
the state as a whole, an indicator of Ukrainians’ continued preference for a strong,

central leader that is in many ways above the institutions of the state. In addition, he

can disband the parliament and call for new elections. He appoints local leaders (ie
governors) on the nomination of the Prime Minister, can submit his own proposal for
Prime Minister (rather than merely responding to a nomination from the parliament as
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is the case in most other systems), and is responsible for nominating and dismissing
one third of the Constitutional Court.

The legislative branch, or Rada, is a unicameral body of 450 seats; however,

neither the Constitution nor the Law of Ukraine on Regulations of the Supreme Council
of Ukraine provides it any powers not given to parliaments of other democratic

systems. Indeed, it lacks many of the oversight mechanisms of other parliaments and is
in many ways simply the modern iteration of its predecessor, the Supreme Soviet of
Ukraine, still a tool of centralized power. The executive branch, the Prime Minister and
his cabinet, are appointed by the Rada, although as mentioned the president can
suggest a prime minister. In addition, key cabinet positions, among them the Ministers
of Foreign Affairs and of Defense, are appointed and chosen by the president. These are
two of the most prestigious cabinet positions, and the prime minister does not have the
ability to use them as leverage when creating a parliamentary coalition, yet another
outlet for the consolidation of presidential power. The judicial branch, as created by the
Constitution, consists of the Constitutional Court of Ukraine as well as the Supreme
Court, regional courts, and local courts. While the judicial system appears functional on
paper, it too has many problems that impact institutionalization. First, the judges on the
Constitutional Court are appointed for nine year terms which, as they were all
appointed at the same time, can cause periods when the court is essentially not
functioning. Secondly, the Constitution created the right to trial by jury, a system which
failed to be implemented during the first decade of independence. When all trials are

trials by judge, the judges have considerable power, and thus there is a large incentive
for political elites to keep certain judges in their pockets for favorable rulings. Third, an
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Appeals Court of Ukraine was theoretically established by the Constitution, although it
has yet to be created; this allows the cronyism system between elites and judges to

flourish without check. Finally, the General Prosecutor of Ukraine, who appoints all
other judges, is appointed by the president and serves at his pleasure, providing strong
incentive to act in ways pleasing to the regime and also making the judicial system
extremely susceptible to the volatility that has characterized the office of the president.
All in all, despite creating a (mostly) theoretically sound democratic system, the desire
on both the part of the elites and the masses for a strong leader led to omission of key
checks and balances, allowing for the subversion of power by the executive branch, a

problem that would rear its head frequently in the future.
Nation-Building Institutions
In addition to creating democratic institutions, political elites also needed to
establish, and quite quickly, at least a legal sense of national identity in Ukraine. This, of

course, would be difficult to do, as the elites themselves could not entirely agree on this
matter. As Table One illustrates, the newly formed political groupings held different,
although overlapping, opinions on Ukraine’s identity, as defined through their feelings
on Russia as the “Other” and on the Russian minority living in Ukraine.
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Table 2.1. Ukrainian Political Parties and their Attitudes towards Russia

Political Tendency

Russia as the ‘Other’

Russian Minority

Ex-national Communists

Ethnoterritorial and
ideological (postcommunist Russia)
Ethnic
Ethnoterritorial and
ideological (former Soviet
Union)
Territorial and
ideological (former Soviet
Union)
Idological (postcommunist Russia)

Inclusive

Nationalists
Center-Right

Centrists

Left

Fifth Column

Inclusive

Inclusive

Inclusive

Source: Kuzio, Taras. “Identity and Nation-Building in Ukraine: Defining the ‘Other’.” Ethnicities
(2001): 343-365.

The legislation that was enacted during the 1990s is a direct result of those
overlapping elements of definition. In November 1991, the ‘Declaration of Rights of
Nationalities of Ukraine’ was passed which “promised that in ‘territorial units, where a
certain nationality lives compactly, their language may function an on equal footing
with the state language’ (i.e. Ukrainian), while ‘the Ukrainian state guaranteed to its
citizens the right to freely use the Russian language”. !” This was followed in 1992 with
the law “About Ethnic Minorities in Ukraine”. This law provides all citizens of Ukraine
regardless of national origin the rights established by the constitution and also provides
for national and cultural autonomy of minority groups. This double sided rhetoric
pacifies both sides of the political spectrum, without truly establishing who is Ukrainian
and who is not. However, a law was also established which criminalized separatist

” Kuzio, Taras and Andrew Wilson. Ukraine: From Perestroika to Independence. St. Martin’s Press, 1994.

22

activity with large fines and prison sentences, which seems, at least in theory, to negate
the cultural and national autonomy of minority groups. The law, despite its ambiguities
on identity, actually provides a more cohesive definition of the nation than does more
recent political actions and public sentiments which have proved much more divisive.

The Problems of Post-Communism:

1991-2004

Leonid Kravchuk
The dissolution of the USSR led to a vote for independence in Ukraine that was
almost unanimously supported; in fact, over ninety percent of Ukrainians supported the
referendum on December 15t, 1991, to formalize independence. Moreover, the majority

of citizens in every oblast, including the Crimea, with its large Russian identifying
population, agreed that legal independence was the appropriate choice for Ukraine.
However, just because nominal independence had been gained did not mean that
Ukrainians wished to alienate and separate themselves fully from Russia. In the nation’s
first elections, four days later, Leonid Kravchuk was elected the first president of
independent Ukraine. Kravchuk had been the Chairman of the Verkhovnaya Rada until

he resigned from the Communist Party in August of 1991. Kravchuk’s presidency was
characterized by an economy in turmoil and a very complex balancing act vis a vis the
new Russian state. Following the collapse of the state-controlled economy and the
drastic shift to open market relations, Ukraine experienced incredibly high inflation
rates, which led to thousands of individuals and businesses defaulting on their loans. In

addition, hundreds of loans made by semi-government banks defaulted, leading to
thousands of Ukrainians in government-employed positions not being paid for years. A
widely dispersed space economy composed of very specific regions of industrialization
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and a widespread, though antiquated, agricultural sector, made it difficult to create
growth at a national level. Caused by Soviet-era allocation of resources, this created

very divergent identities among the differing regions of Ukraine. Clearly, Ukraine’s
economy was in drastic need of an aid influx; however, Western funding, while quite
high immediately after independence, stagnated due to a lack of cohesive economic
policies and evidence that the new Ukrainian government was in far deeper trouble
than originally thought. Due in part to this and in part to the complex structure of
cronyism and nepotism that had characterized relations between producers and the

government during the Soviet era, Kravchuk tacitly approved corruption in the
privatization sector. By granting favors to the oligarchs and their organized crime

associates, he secured both the cash inflows that the economy desperately needed and
the continued political capital his future required.

For example, his political support,

the Social Democratic Party of Ukraine, was run by two major Ukrainian oligarchs with

proven ties to organized violence and crime. 18
In regards to Russia, Kravchuk’s foreign policy choices closely paralleled the
popular mood in Ukraine, one of opportunism. Kravchuk knew he had to give the
appearance of moving away from Russian dominated domestic policy choices, in policy
and not just in rhetoric, to give legitimacy to the new Ukrainian regime. As a result,
Kravchuk refused to keep a common currency with Russia, instead creating a Ukrainian
national currency, the karbovonets. While a sound decision politically, it was disastrous
economically as the karbovonets was subject to hyperinflation and aggravated the

18 Motyl, Alexander J. "The conceptual president: Leonid Kravchuk and the politics of
surrealism." Patterns in post-Soviet leadership (1995): 103-22.
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already dire economic situation after independence. In addition, Ukraine under
Kravchuk decided to create a separate military force, a major step in true autonomy for
the new republic. Unfortunately, many of Kravchuk’s financial and political backers had

close ties to the oligarchs and organized crime families in Russia, and so as the economy
continued to deteriorate at a staggering pace and corruption appeared to run as

rampant as the inflation rate, Kravchuk’s political capital all but disappeared. Thus, in
1994, the populace chose Leonid Kuchma, who ran on a campaign of economic
reconstruction and anti-corruption, as their second president.

Leonid Kuchma
Kuchma’s campaign promises included an overhaul of the entire Ukrainian

economy. He hoped to attempt a multi-sector renovation of the Ukrainian economy,
dismantling the outdated Ukrainian sectors of production and attempting to transform
them into internationally competitive ones, including the privatization of both industry
and agriculture. His proposals for how this would be accomplished- via subsidies
reduction, currency and banking regulation changes, and lowered taxes- as well as the
marginal levels of growth that Ukraine experienced immediately following his election
qualified the nation for a substantial IMF loan. However, Kuchma failed to keep his
election promises to reduce corruption; in fact, corruption levels rose substantially
during his administration. This continued corruption and nepotism led to an
unfortunate subversion of the reforms’ potential, at least at the beginning. However,
starting in 2000, Ukraine experienced a massive level of growth in the economy, with a
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growth rate of 5.9 percent in that year and GDP growth of over nine percent.!9 His
economic policies, known as ‘Kuchmanomics’, as explained by Anders Aslund are
outlined in Table 2 below.

Table 2.2. Kuchmanomics versus Orangeism
institutional Korms

Kuchmanomics

Orangeism

'2005-2008)

(1999-2004)

Growth Regime
Wage-labor nexus

Form of Competition
Monetary Regime

State-Society Relations

Insertion into
International
Regime
Coherence anddynamic
Of the growth regime

Export led national
capitalism
Coordinated/regulated
labor market
combined with
internal bureaucratic
flexibility
By commodity market
prices
Targeted towards

Finance led, increasingly
transnational
§ Towards external market
flexibility

Increasingly on financial
markets
Orientated towards domestic

price and exchange
rate stability
Mercantillism

consumption
Proactive and market-

combined with weak

enhancing state combined

developmental state
Rise of the BRIC
economies

with populism
Globalization of financial
system

Strong exposure to
external disturbances

Risk of systemic financial
instability

These policies generated growth across the board, as Table 3 displays. The south and
east grew slightly faster than the west and center of the nation; however, all oblasts

enjoyed significant growth throughout the first years of the 2000s. However, this
growth was underpinned by critical instabilities, such as the gross divergence of
regional space-economies and the volatility of the credit and banking sectors.
* Aslund, Anders. “The Economic policy of Ukraine After the Orange Revolution.” Eurasian Geography and
Economics 46:5 (2005): 327-353.
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Eventually, this lack of solidity would burst Ukraine’s economic growth though it would
occur long after Kuchma left office.
Table 3.Per Capita GDP and Income, 2001-2003

Region

2002 GDP
per capita

2003 per
capita
income

2001-2003
growth in
population
income

Ternopil’
Ivano-Frankivsk
Lviv
Volyn
Rivne
Vinnitsya
Kyiv (region)
Khmel’nyts’kyy
Chernivtsi
Sumy
Cherkasy
Kyiv (city)
Chernihiv

West and
Central
2,311
3,213
3,292
2,944
2,960
3,015
3,771
2,765
2,323
3,381
2,755
13,713
3,103

3,230
3,476
4,058
3,662
3,823
3,861
4,499
3,680
3,092
4,026
3,657
8,401
3,941

34.2
36.1
35.8
33.4
37.4
35.0
26.0
30.3
34.8
31.0
31.0
49.0
29.0

Zakarpattya

2,559

3,243

41.2

Zhytomyr
Poltava
Kirovohrad

3,765
4,381
3,784

39.7
33.5
30.7

Kherson
Dnipropetrovs'k
Mykolaiv
Odessa

2,555
4,818
3,019
South and
East
2,784
5,071
3,723
4,393

3,425
4,796
4,079
3,872

34.8
32.5
36.2
39.6

Kharkiv

4,075

4,541

37.2

Zaporizhzhya

4,478

4,820

31.6

Autonomous Republic of Crimea
Sevastopol’

2,981
3,701

3,855
4,009

33.8
45.5

Luhans’k

3,374

3,956

36.5

Donets’k

5,240

4,651

36.7

17 Region average (West and Central)
10 Region average (South and East)

3,676
4,115

4,034
4,200

34.6
36.0

Source: Aslund, Anders. “The Economic Policy of Ukraine after the Orange Revolution.” Eurasian
Geography and Economics 46, no.5 (2005): 327-353.
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As mentioned above, Ukraine also experienced a growth in corruption
throughout Kuchma’s time in office. In 2000, the first year data is available, the

Corruptions Perceptions Index gave Ukraine a score of 1.5. However, following
Kuchma’s ouster, Ukraine’s score had risen to a 2.6. This exacerbation of corruption
levels was caused in part by a key tenet of Kuchma’s foreign policy: closer relations
with Russia, at the very least economically. Kuchma entered Ukraine into a special
economic agreement with Russia and the CIS, but on the other hand, he also entered

talks about NATO membership. Thus, he continues the balancing act started by
Kravchuk but slowly moves Ukraine closer to Russia and to a position firmly straddling

Europe and Asia. In addition, Kuchma slowly used these and similar political moves to
consolidate power in the executive branch relative to the parliament. These decisions
earned him high levels of support in the east and the south, regions that desired strong,
decisive, singular, leadership, and lower levels of support in the west, where the hope

for democratic consolidation was higher. 2°
Kuchma also began using media censorship as a primary tool of governance,
restricting the coverage of events by foreign agencies and limiting the scope of domestic
journalists. The dissent over his usage of this tactic came to a head in late 2000, when

an opposition journalist named Georgiy Gongadze was found decapitated in his
apartment. Gongadze had been attempting to trace the relationship between the
government and organized crime, particularly as it related to illegal arm sales. Four

20 Van Zon, Hans. “Political Culture and Neo-Patrimonialism Under Leonid Kuchma.” Problems of PostCommunism 52: 5 (2005): 12-22.
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days after the discovery of the body, opposition parliamentarian Oleksandr Moroz, head
of the Socialist Party of Ukraine, leaked a set of tapes recorded over a period of several
years in President Kuchma’s office. The recording devices were in fact planted by one of
Kuchma’s body guards and then given to Moroz. The tapes allegedly contained the
approval of arms sales to Saddam Hussein by Kuchma and his ordering of Interior
Minister Kravchenko to take care of the “Gongadze problem”. Being embroiled in this
scandal lost Kuchma many of his Western allies and any legitimacy with domestic elites;
it also forced him to lean heavily on support from Russia, something the prosecution

alleged at the trial he had been doing for years. Supposedly, the tapes also included
conversations between Vladimir Putin and Kuchma concerning collaboration on
transnational crime, primarily the drug and human trafficking trades. The immediate
resolution of the trial was an arrangement between Kuchma and the Supreme Court to
peacefully relinquish power in the following election; the scandal would, however,
continue to rock Ukraine until 2011 at the conclusion of the trials where militsiya
officer Olekseyi Pukach, Gongadze’s killer, was determined to be acting solely on the
orders of Interior Minister Kravchenko, without the influence of Kuchma.21

This scandal directly led to 2004’s Orange Revolution. After spending eight years
consolidating power in the executive branch and currying favors from varying savory
and unsavory individuals, Kuchma was not keen to relinquish his control of Ukraine.
Thus, he threw the weight of his supporters behind Viktor Yanukovych, a weight which
would eventually drag Yanukovych down due to blatant election fraud. What both

* Karatnycky, Adrian. "The fall and rise of Ukraine’s political opposition: From Kuchmagate to the Orange
Revolution’." Revolution in Orange. Washington, DC: Carnegie Endowment
for International Peace (2006):

29-44,
29

Yanukovyychch
d
n
a
a
m
h
Kuc

h had failed to realize was that by yt th e

of the game had fundamentally cha
s
le
ru
e
th
,
ce
en
nd
pe
inde
se only desired a change in howe
independence, Ukrainia

second

er
ediately following

mines

w the world perceived thei ir

i

‘
bstantntiiv e change in how power is controlled and exerci ised. By
su
al
tu
ac
an
t
system, no

ituti iona | changes had begun to alter er th that statu s quo. In ord er to
2004, however ; the institut
cal capi pital, Ku chma and his cronies would h ave to chan ge their tactitics
regain their politi
as well.

30

Chapter 3: The Importance of Being “Orange”

The Orange Revolution, arguably the most important event in Ukraine since
independence, has been interpreted:in myriad ways. Detractors of the opposition
movement, both domestically and internationally, have declared it merely a statement
against the blatant nature of the election scandal. Alternatively, democratic proponents
and the political opposition have projected the mass nature of the protests in Kyiv to
signify wide-ranging support for continuing liberal reforms and the dismantling of the
many facets of the current Ukrainian political system. A myriad of motives-ranging from
economic self-interest to the infiltration of Western foreign actors to simply hoping to

destabilize the current regime- have been ascribed to the protestors and their
supporters. Determining the true motives of the protestors, and the true meaning of the
“Orange Revolution”, is essential to understanding how Ukrainians view themselves
and their place in the world, both now and in the future. If the protestors were simply

driven by emotion, by a need to contradict the explicit implication that the government
considered voters apathetic and powerless, then the Orange Revolution amounts to
nothing more than a spontaneous reaction to extraordinary events. If, however, the
outpouring of Ukrainians onto the streets of Kyiv in 2004 was endemic of more multifaceted developments, of an evolution of the way Ukrainians perceive themselves and
the rights they deserve, then perhaps the entire event may indeed deserve the moniker
of “revolution”. As Dominique Arel states, no matter what else the Orange Revolution
might have been or might prove to be, it was “first and foremost a revelation: that
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Ukrainian society had in fact profoundly changed since independence”.”2 In other
words, the institutional changes instigated during the Post-Communist decade had
begun to alter the substance of Ukraine in profound ways.
A Nation Ripe for Change
In order to understand the significance and importance of the Orange Revolution
and what it had the potential to be, we must first examine how Ukraine became ripe for
change. Two years before, the Verkhovna Rada election results revealed a nation slowly
consolidating its political system. Figure 3.1 illustrates the aggregate results of the party
mandate and individual mandate votes.

Aggregate Parliamentary Election Results 2002
Party or Bloc

% of Votes

Party

Individual

Total

Change in

Seats

Seats

Seats

Seats

Bloc Our Ukraine

CPU
For United Ukraine
Bloc Yuliya Tymoshenko
SPU
SDPU
Source: Central Election Commission of Ukraine

While the votes in both regions of Ukraine, here defined as West/Central and
East/South, were dominated by one political party, Bloc Our Ukraine and the
Communist Party of Ukraine respectively, three parties won over ten percent of the
total popular vote, and three others received over five percent of the vote. The CPU also

” Arel, Dominique. “The ‘Orange Revolution’: Analysis and Implications of the 2004 Presidential Election
in Ukraine.” Paper presented at the Third Annual Stasiuk-Cambridge Lecture on Contemporary Ukraine,
Cambridge University, February 25, 2005.
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experienced a rather substantial decline in political power, despite its dominance in the
East and South. The loss of power by the CPU and diversification of the political system
signified a Ukraine primed for change. In addition, only in five oblasts, all of them
Western and Central, did the winning bloc procure more than fifty percent of the total
vote. The top two parties in the twelve other West/Central oblasts and all of the
East/South oblasts received at least ten percent of the oblast’s vote, implying that the
political preferences in the majority of Ukraine were beginning to diversify, a key
element of democratic consolidation. 23

In addition to the fusion and expansion of the political system at the regional
level, the economic growth mentioned in the previous chapter was key to creating an
environment where in the Orange Revolution could occur. Logic dictates and
experience proves that when economic circumstances are dire or strained, people’s
only concern is their day-to-day needs. Once a certain watershed level of economic
growth is achieved, however, priorities begin to shift. Citizens, augmented by a
previously-inexperienced level of financial security, begin to place priority on more
abstract concerns, in this case effective governance. Thus, in a critical way, Kuchma

brought about his own demise through the success of his Kuchmanomics policies.
The Players
Understanding the key figures and movements of the Orange Revolution is key
to comprehending the dismantling of both Kuchma’s regime and the political system
that supported it, at least temporarily. It was clear from the beginning that the 2004
presidential election would not resemble its predecessors. To start, Kuchma’s lack of
”? See Appendix A.
33

eligibility and desire to maintain power led to his aim to seat a sympathetic, yet
malleable successor, one who would guarantee him considerable continued power
within the regime. He found the perfect candidate in Viktor Yanukovych, his Prime
Minister and leader of the Party of Regions, a Russophone, conservative political party,
which emphasized closer ties to Russia, both economically and ideologically, as a key
tenet of its platform. The POR was supported by close ties to organized crime and
corrupt business, especially from the oligarch Renat Akmetov, head of one of Ukraine’s

largest and most violent clans, and was part of the For United Ukraine bloc during the
2002 Rada elections. 24 Yanukovych garnered popular support in the East/South oblasts
and international support from Vladimir Putin. However, like all candidates,

Yanukovych had some critical pitfalls. As Taras Kuzio points out, the first was his
criminal background, reinforced in people’s minds by his dependence on the money and
muscle of his birthplace, the Donbas, a region with “a reputation for criminality,
brutality, and heavy-handed business tactics”25, In addition, Yanukovych made the
irreparable mistake of alienating Ukraine’s youth, one of the key voting blocs in the
2004 election, not only through his rhetoric but also through his proposed policy
platform.
The strongest opposition contender, Viktor Yushchenko, had also been a onetime Prime Minister of Ukraine under Kuchma as well as the head of the National Bank
of Ukraine. After his dismissal from the post of Prime Minister, Yushchenko created the
-** Kuzio, Taras. “From
Revolution.” Problems
25 Kuzio, Taras. “From
Revolution.” Problems
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Our Ukraine opposition group, a self-described “People’s Self-Defense Bloc” and
umbrella party for those in opposition to Kuchma and his policies, and decided to run
for the presidency in 2004. Our Ukraine consisted of an alliance between Yushchenko,
the Yulia Tymoshenko Bloc, the Socialists, and the Communists, essentially the entire

viable left and left-center of the Ukrainian political spectrum. Indeed, orange became
the color of the revolution because it is the color of the Our Ukraine electoral bloc. The
majority of his supporters were Western and Central Ukrainians, primarily

concentrated in Lviv and Kyiv, who valued closer ties, especially economic ones, to
Europe, and wanted to dismantle elements of the corrupt, executive-centric system that

Kuchma had encouraged.
The complex, multi-party nature of Ukrainian politics inherently produced other
opposition candidates as well, though primarily opponents in name only. The
nomination of Oleksandr Moroz, chairman of the Socialist Party of Ukraine, by his party
was a prime example of the compromises necessary in Ukrainian politics. The Socialists,
as part of the Our Ukraine Bloc, knew he would not garner enough votes to have a valid
chance of winning the presidency and thus, in exchange for post-election favors, hoped

to use his campaign to capture some of the voters who might have originally voted for
Yanukovych but would not have voted for Yushchenko, thus enabling Yushchenko to
have a greater chance of winning in a run-off. Their endorsement significantly expanded
his voting base during the elections. Two other challengers, while not tacitly supporting
Yushchenko, had little hope of anything resembling success. One was Petro Symonenko,
the representative of the Communist Party of Ukraine, which had left the Our Ukraine
Bloc in late 2002, a move which led to a sharp decline in popularity, both the party’s and
35

Symonenko’s. The other, Natalyia Vitrenko, had run for the presidency in 1999 and

been defeated. She was the chair of the Progressive Socialist Party of Ukraine which
fractured from the Socialist Party of Ukraine in 1996, under Vitrenko’s leadership. The
PSPU is characterized by desire to integrate with Eurasia rather than with Europe and

its hardliner stance on economic and social issues, separating itself from the SPU,
making her the most divergent of the candidates.
The ‘Hubris of Incompetence’
Following a particularly dirty election season, wherein Yushchenko was even
found to have been poisoned in order to keep him from the race, the first round of the
elections was markedly uneventful. Ukrainian electoral law requires a candidate to
receive higher than fifty percent of the votes in order to be declared president; if any
candidate fails to receive that percentage, a run-off election will be held. On October

315, 2004, over 28 million Ukrainians arrived at the polling stations to vote. Out of the
twenty-four individual candidates, only five received at least one percent of the total
votes, namely Yanukovych, Yushchenko, Moroz, Symonenko, and Vitrenko (see Table

3.1). Of the five, only Yanukovych and Yushchenko, as expected, presented themselves
as viable second round candidates. According to official data from the Central Election
Commission, Yanukovych received around 11,009,000 votes, or 39.26 percent of the
popular vote. Yushchenko received about 180,000 more votes, for a total of 39.9

percent of the vote. However, these totals were not entirely accurate. The Central
Election Commission is allowed a period of up to ten days before it must release the
election results; the CEC used this period to “massage the count downwards for
Yushchenko and upwards for Yanukovych”, covering their deception by allowing
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Yushchenko to win by a small margin.?¢ In response to this first round, as stated above,

Moroz threw his support behind Yushchenko, while Vitrenko through hers behind
Yanukovych, the only one of the round one candidates to do so. Symonenko and the
Communists, on the other hand, refused to support either candidate in the second
round.

Three weeks later, on November 215*, the run-off elections were held. Despite

the suspicion of Ukrainians over the time it took the CEC to report the results of the first
round, the day itself ran quite smoothly. Over 30,000,000 Ukrainians participated in the
electoral process that day, attempting to express their preferences for the future of
their country. Unbeknownst to them, however, the institutions and individuals
committed to keeping a pro-Russian, right-centrist candidate in office who would not
dismantle any of the patronage system that Kuchma had worked so hard to build, had
planned for a second, more direct tampering of the election results. Election rigging is a
complex proposal in the best of circumstances, an undertaking that requires not only
skill, but also subtlety. However, their “hubris of incompetence ultimately doomed the
regime”.2” As previously mentioned, the Donbas (Donetsk and nearby Luhansk) was the
center of Yanukovych’s power structure; the cash in his slush funds, the public donors

and the private backers, the muscle, as it were, of the campaign all originated in
Donetsk. Thus, when exceptionally high levels of support, reported at around ninety-six
percent, were reported for Yanukovych, it hardly caused even a perfunctory eye-brow

26 Kuzio, Taras. “From Kuchma to Yushchenko: Ukraine’s 2004 Presidential Elections and the Orange
Revolution.” Problems of Post-Communism 52:2 (2005): 32.
27 Arel, Dominique. “The ‘Orange Revolution’: Analysis and Implications of the 2004 Presidential Election
in Ukraine.” Paper presented at the Third Annual Stasiuk-Cambridge Lecture on Contemporary Ukraine,
Cambridge University, February 25, 2005.
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raise. The mistake came in not the percentage of votes Yanukovych was said to have
won, but rather the sheer number of individuals who had voted. Donetsk claimed a

voter turnout of ninety-seven percent, a statistically implausible level even in the most
politically conscious of nations. The reported turnout was 16 percent higher than the
nation’s mean and a full 20 percent higher than the levels reported in Donetsk just three
weeks prior. Almost immediately after polling stations had closed massive numbers of
votes were fraudulently placed in ballot boxes, all bearing Yanukovych’s name. Indeed,
had the perpetrators simply exercised some restraint, they might have succeeded in
stealing the election. However, when exit polls had Yushchenko leading by an eight
percent margin and the official results reported three days later had him losing by a
three percent margin, the opposition and its supporters immediately cried foul.

“Orange” Takes to the Streets
Barely hours after the “official” elections results were reported, Yushchenko
called on his supporters to challenge them. What many expected, both domestic and
foreign actors, was a small-scale uprising and then a gradual return to business as usual
once the opposition and the regime had worked out some form of compromise. “What
happened instead was a mass outpouring on the streets and swelling numbers, instead
of diminishing ones.”28 This mass outpouring was composed of three primary groups:
the organizers, the common citizens, and former Yanukovych supporters who quickly
realized that his immediate political future was not very bright. The organizers were
composed both of experienced civil society groups, including members of the Yulia

* Arel, Dominique. “The ‘Orange Revolution’: Analysis and Implications of the 2004 Presidential Election
in Ukraine.” Paper presented at the Third Annual Stasiuk-Cambridge Lecture on Contemporary Ukraine,
Cambridge University, February 25, 2005.
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Tymoshenko Bloc, who had gained their experience during the Kuchmagate protests
and other incidents of the prior decade and the PORA! (It’s Time!) student movement,
whose practical protest experience was more limited. That did not stop the young
protestors, “a generation that had not been in a position of authority during the Soviet
era”, from becoming “the driving force, both at ground level and at central command”.29
They provided the Orange movement with a passion and determination of create
change, unfettered by the disappointments suffered by the older organizers. They were
influential in bringing in wide swaths of the population to the Maidan to protest. The
common protestors were not necessarily highly politicized; rather, they were average

citizens outraged by the blatant attempt to steal the election and subvert the popular
vote, something they considered an extension of Kuchma’s degrading treatment of the
narod during his almost decade in power. Regionally speaking, the majority came from
the western two-thirds of the country, although, somewhat surprisingly, the bulk came
from central, rather than western, Ukraine. The uprising of central Ukrainians,

traditionally thought to be characterized by a compromise between both of the pole in
identity established in the east and the west, added an important dynamic to the Orange
protests. At the elite level, media agencies, state institutions, and local governments
expressed both support for Orange and disgust with Yanukovych’s tactics. Yanukovych
hoped to end the protests with a show of force, but even the Interior Ministry and the
security forces defected from his camp, leaving him practically ally-less in the face of

* Arel, Dominique. “The ‘Orange Revolution’: Analysis and Implications of the 2004 Presidential Election
in Ukraine.” Paper presented at the Third Annual Stasiuk-Cambridge Lecture on Contemporary Ukraine,
Cambridge University, February 25, 2005.
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almost two weeks of widescale Orange protests. “For the first time in Ukrainian history,
an organized society acted as a counter-weight to the state.”30
Of course, the regime immediately took a defensive stance, claiming that the

uproar was simply an American plot to destabilize the Ukrainian political system. For
their part, America had already denounced the election rigging and voiced quite
emphatic support for the protesters at the Maidan. Foreign press correspondents wrote
scathing analyses of the fraud and created a media firestorm. The European Union had

expressed similar outrage, denouncing the actions of Yanukovych’s campaign. Both
Western powers also provided surreptitious financial backing for the tent city that
erupted in Kyiv. On the other hand, Russian president Vladimir Putin had called to
congratulate Yanukovych on his “election victory” and proceeded to stand behind him
during the protests. However, in the face of massive uprisings and such blatant election
fraud, the Supreme Court of Ukraine had no choice but to rule on December 3" that the
elections had in fact been illegitimate. Kuchma and Putin lobbied for a complete rerunning of the election, beginning with a multi-candidate first round. The Supreme
Court rather ruled that in three weeks, on December 26, a repeat of the second round
run-off would occur.

The second runoff went off without as much as a hiccup. After being tarred as
corrupt due to the fraud accusations and watching many of his allies abandon him,
Yanukovych knew his chances of victory were slim. The two weeks of protests had
allowed popular opinion, both domestic and foreign, to oversimplify the election, taking
* Arel, Dominique. “The ‘Orange Revolution’: Analysis and Implications of the 2004 Presidential Election
in Ukraine.” Paper presented at the Third Annual Stasiuk-Cambridge Lecture on Contemporary Ukraine,
Cambridge University, February 25, 2005.
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it from a fairly complex discussion about the functions of the state to a battle between
good and evil. This was furthered by Western officials decrying Its simplistic nature
made this dichotomy ideal for Yushchenko to utilize to win the second run-off, which he
did on December 26" with 51.99 percent of the votes to Yanukovych’s 44.19, a rather
staggering margin of victory. The real challenge would be consolidating the momentum
created by Orange to actually produce viable systemic change, a challenge which
Yushchenko would find infinitely more difficult than he had hoped for.
Assessing “Orange”: 2005-2007
Explaining the events of the Orange protests is an infinitely easier undertaking
than analyzing its results, as the Orange Revolution raises far more questions about the
state of governance and identity in Ukraine than it answers. The first question that
much be considered is was the Orange Revolution successful? The answer, of course,
depends on how we define “success” and on what the goals of the movement were. If
the Orange Revolution meant simply to challenge the election results and lead toa
change of leadership, then of course, the second run-off mandated by the Supreme
Court’s ruling must be considered a success. If, however, the Orange Revolution was, as
Dominique Arel asserts, the creation of an organized civil society that has the cohesion
and strength to serve as a counterpoint to the government, then the answer is less clear.
For the purposes of this research, the success or failure of the Orange Revolution will
ultimately be judged on how well civil society consolidated the momentum and
cohesion introduced by “Orange” in the spheres of economics, politics (namely
institutionalized politics), and society, specifically identity.
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Economic Implications
One of the key pillars of consolidation for the Orange movement would be fusing
the economic growth attained up to 2004 with political security. Citizens would judge
the movement on its capacity to produce the same level of growth and prosperity they

had become accustomed to with increased political transparency and functionality.
Economically speaking, the Orange Revolution represented a shift in people’s
preferences; no longer was capitalism chosen simply by default, as it was after
independence. Now, citizens were actively making a choice between two separate forms
of capitalism: the liberal capital model embodied by Yushchenko and the oligarchic,
oligopolistic model represented by Yanukovych.
Despite the clearly expressed preference for liberal capitalism that
Yushchenko’s victory implied, his policies did take that tact. Rather, he pursued a strong
policy of socialist populism, with heavy emphasis on re-privatization through the work
of Prime Minister Yulia Tymoshenko, a socialist now at the helm of the State Property
Fund. This policy is outlined in Table 2.1 in contrast to the principle of Kuchmanomics.
The push for radical re-privatization is a logical outcome of the election stealing crisis,
wherein oligarchs appeared to steal the election simply because they had the money
and the means to do so. What better way to emphasize that the oligarchs have been
thoroughly defeated than to forcibly sacrifice their material wealth on the altar of the
revolution? Despite its logical basis, the policies of the new government do not
accurately reflect the preferences or makeup of its supporters; the liberal and rural
heart of Yushchenko’s support was cut off at the knees by a statute that placed a hold on
the trading of agricultural land until 2007, a move Yushchenko only encouraged to gain
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the support of Moroz. Worse still, the re-privatization campaign led to a drastic drop in
investment, construction, and GDP growth. By re-privatizing, Yushchenko created an
economic climate too hazardous for investors, the exact opposite of the changes his
supporters had hoped he would achieve. In addition, small entrepreneurs who made up
a key group of Yushchenko’s supporters suffered severe losses due to the tax law
changes Yushchenko introduced. So, in this sphere, at the very least, the Orange

movement failed to create a middle class capable of causing sustainable change in how
their preferences are translated to policy actions, a key element of truly democratized

nations, which began to signal to voters that perhaps their new leaders were not truly
all that far removed from their predecessors. 31
Political Ramifications
The Orange Revolution and Yushchenko’s victory also lead to significant
institutional changes in Ukrainian politics, causing a revision of its institutions, rather
than a revolution, in 2004- a revision which primarily concerned itself with election law
reform. The mixed system of parliamentary elections was eliminated, and the threshold
for being able to enter parliament was lowered by a full percent. Prior to 2004, during
the 2002 Rada elections for example, a certain percentage of seats were voted on
according to party lists while voters selected individual candidates for the other seats,
similar to the current German model. In regards to the balance of power between
branches, the institutional reforms can be viewed as “a move from strong presidentparliamentary system to a strong parliamentary-president system of government”
wherein the president appoints the prime minister, but all other appointments have
31 Aslund, Anders. “The Economic policy of Ukraine After the Orange Revolution.” Eurasian Geography
and Economics 46:5 (2005): 327-353.
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become the purview of the parliament.32 This series of reforms hopefully would
eliminate some of the cronyism and nepotism that plagued previous governments and
slowly start to institutionalized the presidency as subject to the same checks and
balances as the other three branches, effectively making the president no longer above
the government's structure.
The new government was not entirely pleased with these reforms, however,
feeling as though Yushchenko should have at least as much power to undo the results
Kuchma’s policies as his predecessor had to cause them, despite the fact that Kuchma
himself had found a scaled back presidency acceptable all along. In addition, these
reforms raise the question of whether the parliament will be able to use its newly
gained authority to govern effectively. Part of the reason a stronger presidential system
was encouraged was the ineffective nature of the Rada- party factionalism, constantly
changing coalitions, and nearly nonexistent party discipline had created a parliament
that barely functioned during a time when Ukraine needed decisive leadership. As
Gongadze’s murder proved, the president could clearly not be trusted to make those
decisions in the people’s best interests. The fluid nature of electoral blocs in Ukraine
complicates that situation, as the “electoral majority” only has hope of effectively
legislating if it does in fact remain the majority. While these reforms clearly have
promise, they only go so far to provide an institutional framework wherein governance
can be an effective representation of mass preferences. Lacking a simplified tax code,
reformed campaign finance laws, an effective civil service system, and a truly

* Christensen, Robert K., Edward R. Rakhimkulov, and Charles R. Wise. “The Ukrainian Orange

Revolution brought more than a new president: what kind of democracy will the institutional changes
bring?” Communist and Post-Communist Studies 38 (2005): 207-230.
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independent judiciary, there is no real way to prevent the political machine system
from continuing to govern Ukraine, through slightly different mechanisms. 33
The Verkhovna Rada elections of 2006 also revealed an important change
perpetuated by the Orange Revolution: the very uneven beginnings of de-polarization in
the Ukrainian system. While two parties still dominated the aggregate results, as
illustrated below in Figure 3.2, the results by region reveal a slightly more nuanced
situation. The first and second parties in the majority of West/Central oblasts have a
much smaller range of votes between them then they did in 2002. For example, in

Chernivtsi in 2002, the range between the first and second place parties was 36.17% of
the vote, and in 2006, it was only 3.34%. The same pattern does not emerge in the
South/East regions, though; in Mykolaiv, the range increases from 15.15% in 2002 to
38.45% in 2006. In addition, seven oblasts in the South and East had parties that won
with over fifty percent of the total voting, none of which had experienced such high
levels of consolidation in 2002. Thus, while more parties were gaining electoral
prominence in the West and Central oblasts, Eastern and Southern Ukraine was

growing increasingly more polarized and consolidated. In addition, the 2006 Rada
elections also ended with the Orange coalition having too few seats to form the
government, ushering in the Prime Ministry of Yanukovych, a crushing fact in light of
2004’s events.

33 D’Anieri, Paul. “What Has Changed in Ukrainian Politics? Assessing the Implications of the Orange
Revolution.” Problems of Post-Communism 52:5 (2005): 82-91.
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Social Effects

The final sphere wherein the Orange Revolution led to significant changes was
social construction and identity. In previous elections, Central Ukraine had served as a

buffer zone between the nation’s two ideological poles. Lviv, in the west, represented
the liberal, pro-European stance, while Donetsk, in the east, represented the more
oligarchic, pro-Russian stance. Central Ukraine, and Kyiv in particular, had previously
represented an area of compromise between the two regions. However, the Orange
Revolution demonstrated that Ukrainians in the center and the west shared a much
more common and cohesive view of their identity than did central and eastern
Ukrainians. While this is a positive sign on the surface, namely that liberal ideologies

are spreading throughout the nation, it has distinct negative connotations. With the
dispersion of the compromise zone in Central Ukraine, the nation has in fact become
more geographically polarized. This polarization leads to a system wherein eastern

Ukrainians feel as though they are excluded from the nation-building project. Growing
levels of alienation created a situation wherein Eastern Ukrainians consolidate around a
stance quite divergent from those held by the rest of the nation as evidenced by the
2006 Rada elections. Even if this feeling does not lead to a strong separatist urge in
eastern Ukraine, it could drastically impede governance in the country as a whole. 34
Conclusion
Looking at all three spheres in which the Orange Revolution has caused large
ramifications, it is clear that it signified more than simply a mass protest event. In my
opinion, the Orange Revolution was the start of a real “revolution”, though certainly not
* Arel, Dominique. “The ‘Orange Revolution’: Analysis and Implications of the 2004 Presidential Election
in Ukraine.” Paper presented at the Third Annual Stasiuk-Cambridge Lecture on Contemporary Ukraine,
Cambridge University, February 25, 2005.
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Chapter Four: Rotten Oranges
While the Orange Revolution appeared to be a critical, perhaps catalytic, event in
the post-Communist history of Ukraine, its potential in many ways failed to be realized.
Policies enacted by Yushchenko, most importantly the widescale privatization, and
their subsequent failure to bring about the positive changes voters had hoped for began
to call into question the legitimacy of Orange as a self-sustaining political force. This
crisis of effectiveness was exacerbated by two key events that eventually doomed the
perpetuation of the Orange Revolution. The first, in the later years of Yushchenko’s first
term in office, was the parliamentary crisis of 2007 which revealed the deep, intrinsic
weaknesses of the Orange coalition and catalyzed its descent into rampant factionalism.

The second, occurring just two short years later, was the global economic crisis of 2009,
which illuminated not only the shortcomings of Yushchenko’s economic strategy but of
the entire Ukrainian economic system. Both calamities were exacerbated by the
challenge that has underlain the Ukrainian political situation since independence:
balancing domestic ambitions and politics against the backdrop ofa complicated and
still polarized international order. Following independence and the dissolution of the
USSR, Ukraine elites, as citizens of the largest European former Soviet republic, found
themselves in the position of having to play mediator not only on the domestic scale,
but on the international one as well. External perceptions of Ukraine’s role on the global
stage in general and on the Eurasian one in particular have come to be as critical to the
institutionalization of democracy in the country as domestically negotiated policy
choices. In addition, this reliance on external signals has left Ukraine more vulnerable to
any shocks to the status quo, a fact the great Global Financial Crisis (GFC) of 2009
48

illustrates quite clearly. The parliamentary crisis of 2007 greatly shook the regime’s

foundations, but it was the GFC and the government's absolute inability to mitigate its
devastating effects that would put the final nail in the coffin. The Orange Revolution,
despite its best efforts, could not reconcile the disparity between the institutions in
Ukraine (and their potential to be subverted) and the identity of the people as
expressed by their votes. Thus, when the system built by the supposed keepers of the
preferred identity shows signs of falling apart, it delegitimizes the entire system, not
just those in power and quickly leads, as the concluding remarks to this thesis will

explain, to a reversion to former models of government.
The Challenges of Balance

In order to fully understand the implications of these crises for Ukraine’s future,
the details of what it truly means to be a buffer zone must be teased out. To that effect, a
brief summation of perceptions towards and policies regarding Ukraine on the part of
both the European Union and Russia will follow below. Aligning the nation, in any way,

with either of these two entities means shifting the balance ever so slightly to one side,
and a crisis on the scale of the GFC means that those subtle shifts are inexorably
magnified to the point that they leave long reaching ramifications. The two opposing
external forces crease incentives for polarity, which protracts the identity unification

process.
The European Union

From the moment of independence, the external perceptions of Ukraine’s future
held by European elites and EU policymakers seemed to determine in many ways the
path the country would take, regardless of the desires of domestic actors. In the early
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1990s, the EU assumed that Ukraine and its fellow Soviet successor states would all
follow a fairly uniform pattern: nominal independence while continuing to receive
policy signals from Russia.3> Indeed, rather than allow Ukraine to sign an Association
Agreement immediately after independence, as many of the CEE countries did, the EU

offered Ukraine only a PCA, or Partnership and Cooperation Agreement, and a weak one
at that. Despite substantial rhetoric not only from the EU as a body but from the leaders
of individual nations calling for democratic revolutions in the former Soviet sphere and
for an opening of the Soviet Union itself, this attitude reveals that European elites had

very low hopes for the future of democracy in the former Soviet Socialist Republics
(SSRs). The fact that these opinions shaped EU policy even before the official
establishment of the Ukrainian state means that Ukrainian elites were behind the eight
ball, so to speak, in the court of external public opinion from the beginning. However,
strong rhetorical commitment to Europe from the very beginning sent a strong signal to
the EU that Ukraine, despite its history, desired to be accepted as not ‘Eurasian’, but as
European in its own right. What they hoped for was a strong signal that they were
viewed as eventual members, a signal which was not forthcoming. This pattern
continued throughout the 1990s and into the early 2000s; the lack of substantive
deepening in relations between the EU and Ukraine due to a lack of initiative and
willingness on the part of the EU created a situation where the EU “has been yet been
unable...to persuade the Ukrainian government to introduce deep systemic changes.”36

35 Zagorski, Andrei. EU Policies Towards Russia, Ukraine, Moldova and Belarus. Geneva Center for Security
Policy, 2002.
36 Zagorski, Andrei. EU Policies Towards Russia, Ukraine, Moldova and Belarus. Geneva Center for Security

Policy, 2002.
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A signal arrived, albeit one not as decisive as Ukrainian elites were hoping for, in
2005 when the European Neighborhood Policy (ENP) when into effect. Its main
component is the Ukraine-EU AP (Action Plan) which is a mutually negotiated policy
path that “envisages projecting not only Community norms and values, such as
democracy and human rights, but the standards of the Union as a whole.”37 While this
AP provides a signal from the EU as to Ukraine’s place within it, it is neither as strong
nor as clear as Ukrainians might hope. The ENP also includes the entire Mediterranean

coast of Africa as well as the Levant, regions which are not even geographically located
in Europe, and Ukraine’s AP lacks rhetoric that indicates future hopes for EU
membership, owing to Ukraine’s lack of a strong and committed set of actors who are

capable of pushing the reforms through, despite domestic gridlock, a presupposition of
eventual membership.38 The ENP remains a step forward in Ukrainian-EU relations,
despite its halfhearted signaling, as the AP provides the promise of future rewards short
of membership, such as a free visa regime and the deep Free Trade Area established by
the ENP and the highly favored economic cooperation the AP entails, that incentivize
Ukraine’s continued push for “deeper integration, until the membership question is
finally answered.” 39

37 Wolczuk, Kataryna. "Implementation without coordination: The impact of EU conditionality on Ukraine
under the European neighbourhood policy." Europe-Asia Studies 61, no. 2 (2009): 187-211.
38 Wolczuk, Kataryna. Integration without Europeanisation: Ukraine and its Policy towards the European
Union. Working Paper RSCAS 15, European University Institute, 2004.

39 Gawrich, Andrea, Inna Melykovska, and Rainer Schweickert. “Neighbourhood Europeanization through
ENP: The Case of Ukraine.” Journal of Common Market Studies 48, no.5 (2010): 1209-1235.
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Russia

The other major external player on Ukraine’s identity and policy is obviously
Russia. Following the dissolution of the Soviet Union, Russia’s world power dropped
substantially as it ceased to be a global hegemon; in response, it attempted to shore up
its influence in its former republics to ensure continued regional power. Ukraine,
having enjoyed special status under the Soviet system as the largest and most
prosperous of the republics after Russia, felt no need to dissemble those bonds, despite
independence. In the first decade after independence, Ukraine and Russia enjoyed a
fairly un-contentious relationship in spite of Kravchuk’s pro-independence policies.
Even issues such as Ukraine’s decision to create its own currency and military structure

caused few ripples in relations. Much of this was due to Russia’s desire to play a larger
role in the issues of Europe, a signal that policy choices were changing after the end of
the Cold War, and the fact that Ukraine was having little success in integrating into the

larger European structure, which signaled to Russia that Ukraine would remain firmly
in its sphere of influence. 4°
This status quo underwent many changes during the second decade after

independence. When NATO intervened in Kosovo, Russia felt the balance of the region
shift solidly out of its control for the first time. Thus, it attempted to more firmly

integrate Ukraine into Russian-led structures, such as the Common Economic Space. In
addition, Putin felt as though Russia’s close ties to Ukraine and its large economic
interests in the nation- it consistently ranks first on Ukraine’s list of trading partners‘0 Samokhvalov, Vsevolod. Relations in the Russia-Ukraine-EU Triangle:" zero-sum Game" Or Not?.

European Union Institute for Security Studies, 2007.
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justified certain behaviors. Among these was occasionally morally ambiguous
relationship between Kuchma, Putin, and organized crime and the large amounts of
both monetary and political support he threw behind Yanukovych in 2004.4! However,

after the Orange Revolution and initial push for closer integration with Europe, citizens
were less than pleased about Putin’s exceptional influence in their country, something
Russia did not expect. As relations with the EU have evolved, albeit at a slow pace,
relations with Russia, at least in terms of political interdependence, have slowed;
indeed, as Ukraine seeks deeper integration with the EU, it simultaneously is now only
nominally a member of the CIS, preferring to partake in only the economic side of that

body. This has led Russia to view Ukraine in much the way a parent views an errant
teenager: willing to give it freedom, but only within certain limits. For example, when
Ukraine was found to have supplied arms to the Georgians during the South Ossetia
conflict in 2008, Putin threatened to raise Ukrainian prices on Russian oil and natural

gas, goods which Ukraine receives at large discount. As the above illustrates, Ukrainian
policymakers walk a fine line when they attempt to externalize their identity into
policy. When Yanukovych and others like him make policy, the EU takes a step further

back from Ukraine, but when Yushchenko and his supporters hold power, policy
choices get made that result in a perturbed Moscow. Neither option is one that bodes
particularly well for Ukraine, especially economically.

* samokhvalov, Vsevolod. Relations in the Russia-Ukraine-EU Triangle:" zero-sum Game" Or Not?.
European Union Institute for Security Studies, 2007.
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2007 Parliamentary Exigency

The Orange Coalition had remarkable success for a coalition so haphazardly
constructed. Plagued by personal rivalries and dogmatic differences, the members of
Orange were united only truly by their desire to depose of Kuchma and his cronies.
These divisions became evident throughout the first years of Yushchenko’s presidency

and culminated in the dismissal of then Prime Minister Yuliya Tymoshenko. After the
2006 Verkhovna Rada elections, as mentioned in Chapter 3, the Orange coalition was
upstaged by the Party of Regions, Yanukovych’s party. A failed coalition attempt by the
parties behind Orange allowed him to form the new government and signifying the
official start of post-Orange politics.

Yanukovych immediately started testing the boundaries of his new role, using
the institutional changes codified as a result of Orange to expand the scope of his
position. He attempted to make foreign policy the purview of the prime minister when
he announced in Jate 2006 that Ukraine would no longer be pursuing membership in
NATO, an assertion Yushchenko fervently denied. Tensions ratcheted when a bill
passed the Rada in early 2007 that would have institutionalized more authority to
Yanukovych which Yushchenko quickly vetoed. Mere months later, Yushchenko called
for the dissolution of the Rada and immediate, government-financed elections. For
many Ukrainians, this behavior was a red flag about the nature of the current regime.
This was only exacerbated when, in April, Yushchenko dismissed two judges from the
Constitutional Court after Yanukovych accused him of dismissing the parliament
without sufficient grounds. A compromise was met in late May that set elections for
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September, elections that resulted in a win for the Party of Regions, though
Tymoshenko, after protracted negotiation, became prime minster once again.
For average Ukrainians, despite their accustomedness to governmental crises,

the events of late 2006-early 2007 raised numerous concerns. Chief among them was
the true nature of the post-Orange regime. Bloc Our Ukraine and Bloc Yuliya
Tymoshenko had portrayed themselves to be the keepers of the “values of the Maidan”
(essentially the desire of Ukrainians to live a nation that resembles its neighbors, with

open markets and transparent democracy), but the infighting that plagued them before
the dismissal of the Rada and then Yushchenko’s actions during the crisis seemed to
demonstrate that perhaps they were not a departure from “politics as usual” at all*2.
The rhetoric of the Revolution seemed to be simply a means to gain power, rather than
a true ideology. However, the crisis revealed some positive facts about the everchanging Ukrainian political system. Multiple parties won substantial seats in the Rada,
and only one party in parliament changed. The contentiousness of the government

formation was open and transparent and illustrates a growing political choice in
Ukraine. Despite these advances, the 2007 crisis was the beginning of the death knell
for the members of Orange.
The Global Financial Crisis
Despite the above mentioned difficulties, Ukraine, Russia, and the EU appeared
to have come to an uneasy status quo by the mid-2000s. However, the GFC of 2009
altered that drastically. Prior to 2009, Ukraine had been experiencing an unprecedented

® Herron, Erik S. “The Parliamentary Election in Ukraine, September 2007.” Electoral Studies 27:3
(2008): 551-555,
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level of economic growth accompanied by a large credit boom. Following the temporary
hit the economy sustained in 2006, Ukraine’s economy rebounded very well, increases
not only its overall trade volume, but also its quantity of trade with both the EU and

Russia, its two largest trading partners. While this boom obviously financed a great deal
of consumption, it was of concern to foreign and domestic economists due to Ukraine’s

macroeconomic imbalances, namely large current account surpluses built on the back
of strong export prices and undervalued currency rates. When nations with high
quantities of macro-level volatility experience rapid credit growth, it can quickly
escalate to banking sector distress, which occurred in Ukraine in 2009. Just as in the
PIIGS, the credit bubble burst and sent the entire economy reeling. 43
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8 Duenwald, C., N. Gueorguiev, and A. Schaechter. Too much of a good thing? Credit Booms in Transition
Economies: The Cases of Bulgaria, Romania and Ukraine. Working Paper 128, International Monetary Fund,
2005.
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As the chart above illustrates, the financial crisis, which also had devastating

effects for the EU as a whole, greatly decreased the volume of trade between the EU and
Ukraine. Russia, on the other hand, remained fairly stable throughout the crisis due to
its large natural resource wealth. Ukraine, desperately in need of economic support,
reached an agreement with the IMF. However, the economic crisis resulted in a change
in the balance of power between Russia, Ukraine and the EU. For Ukraine’s part, Russia

represented a more stable option for direct investment following the collapse as its
economic system was proving to be fairly resilient. The EU on the other hand was in just

as dire straits, Unfortunately, this exacerbated the power of the oligarchs in both Russia
and Ukraine as their financing of the banks further consolidated their power. On the
part of the EU, the GFC further broke down the hopes for Ukraine’s future membership

in the EU as the Union was not willing to further integrate with a nation that proved to
be just as volatile as their PIIGS. After the GFC, elites and normal citizens, both
domestic and foreign, were exceptionally wary of further economic interdependence.
Thus, the financial crisis was truly the last straw in the destruction of the dreams of the
Orange coalition of creating a Ukraine capable of acting with some level of authority in
the European sphere.
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version of democracy in Ukraine quite unlike that which the Orangeites were hoping to
solidify.

The following infographic illustrates the overarching summary of this thesis and
is useful for understanding where, exactly, the consolidation process breaks down.
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The remaining question is, of course, if Ukraine has had the numerous
opportunities for consolidation mentioned in the body of this thesis, why has it been
unable to capitalize upon them? That is, why does the flow chart break down between
the third to last and penultimate steps? It is the opinion of this author that Ukraine is
not consolidating its democracy in the traditional sense because traditional, liberal
democracy holds no incentives for domestic or foreign political elites. Both groups
benefit from a situation wherein democratic institutions can be used as tools of
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Appendix A: The 2002 Verkhovna Rada Elections
Party Mandate Votes by Region-2002
Region

Top Three Parties

Percentage of Votes

West and Central

Ternopil

lvano-Frankivsk

Lviv

Volyn

Rivne

Vinnitsya

Kyiv (Region)

Khmel’ntys’kyy

Chernivtsi

Sumy

Cherkasy

Kyiv (city)

Chernihiv

Bloc Our Ukraine*
Bloc Yuliya Tymoshenko |
For United Ukraine
Bloc Our Ukraine*
Bloc Yuliya Tymoshenko
For United Ukraine
Bloc Our Ukraine*
Bloc Yuliya Tymoshenko |
For United Ukraine
Bloc Our Ukraine*
Bloc Yuliya Tymoshenko |
For United Ukraine

69.01
18.83
1.86
74.61
9.86
2.45
63.92
17.13
3.43
57.55
13.31
8.01

Bloc Our Ukraine*

54.80

For United Ukraine

10.63

Bloc Yuliya Tymoshenko
Bloc Our Ukraine

9.91
29.43

SPU

21.26

Bloc Yuliya Tymoshenko |
Bloc Our Ukraine

13.47
25.78

SPU
CPU

11.93
10.81

Bloc Our Ukraine

34.79

CPU

13.46

Bloc Yuliya Tymoshenko
Bloc Our Ukraine

12.64
46.27

SDPU

10.10

CPU
Bloc Our Ukraine

8.17
18.61

For United Ukraine

17.05

CPU

16.49

Bloc Our Ukraine

26.98

SPU

18.94

CPU

13.30

Bloc
Bloc
Bloc
Bloc

Our Ukraine
Yuliya Tymoshenko
Unity
Our Ukraine

CPU
SPU

28.05
12.83
11.62
24.81
16.63
15.13
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Zakarpattya

Zhytomyr

Poltava

Kirovohrad

Bloc Our Ukraine

36.50

SDPU

13.94

For United Ukraine
Bloc Our Ukraine

9.96
21.84

CPU
For United Ukraine
SPU
Bloc Our Ukraine
CPU
CPU
SPU
For United Ukraine

18.85
12.65
22.05
20.46
17.69
22.24
15.15
13.29

East and South

Kherson

CPU
Bloc Our Ukraine
SPU

31.59
11.82
8.21

Dnipropetrovs’k

CPU

31.86

For United Ukraine
SDPU
CPU
For United Ukraine
SDPU
CPU
For United Ukraine
SDPU
CPU
For United Ukraine
SDPU
CPU
SDPU
Bloc Our Ukraine
CPU
SDPU
Bloc Our Ukraine
CPU
For United Ukraine
Bloc Ruses
CPU
For United Ukraine
SDPU
For United Ukraine
CPU
SDPU
Bloc Our Ukraine

11.43
9.58
29.29
14.14
12.09
26.20
14.37
8.03
30.69
15.38
10.36
33.40
10.68
7.93
33.91
12.47
9.77
32.73
13.15
8.83
39.69
14.38
9.48
36.83
29.78
4.66
15/17 regions

Mykolaiv

Odessa

Kharkiv

Zaporizhzhya

Autonomous Republic of Crimea

Sevastopol’

Luhans’k

Donets’k

17 Region Aggregate

(West and Central)
10 Region Aggregate (East and South) | CPU

9/10 regions
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source: Central Election Commission of Ukraine

* Indicates a bloc/party received more than fifty percent of the vote

Composition of Key Political Blocs 2002
Bloc Our Ukraine

For United Ukraine

Bloc Yuliya Tymoshenko

Congress of Ukrainian

Agrarian Party of Ukraine

All-Ukrainian Union

Nationalists
Liberal Party of Ukraine

People’s Democratic Party

Youth Party of Ukraine

Party of Industrialists and

“Fatherland”
Ukrainian People’s Party
Assembly
Ukrainian Republican Party

Entrepreneurs of Ukraine

People’s Movement of

Party of Regions

Ukraine

Our Ukraine
Solidarity
|Party of Christian-Popular

Ukrainian Social Democratic
Party

Toiling Ukraine

Union

Forward, Ukraine!
Republican Christian Party
Ukrainian People’s Movement
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Appendix B: The 2006 Verkhovna Rada Election

Winning Parties by Region
Region

Top Three Parties

Percentage of Votes

West and Central

Ternopil

\vano-Frankivsk

Lviv

Bloc Yuliya Tymoshenko
Bloc Our Ukraine
Ukrainian People’s Bloc
Bloc Our Ukraine
Bloc Yuliya Tymoshenko
Ukrainian People’s Bloc
Bloc Our Ukraine
Bloc Yuliya Tymoshenko
Pora-PRP

Volyn

Rivne

Vinnitsya

Kyiv (Region)

Khmel’ntys’kyy

Chernivtsi

34.49
34.16
10.20
45.06
30.39
5.44
37.95
33.04
5.05

Bloc Yuliya Tymoshenko
Bloc Our Ukraine
Ukrainian People’s Bloc
Bloc Our Ukraine
Bloc Yuliya Tymoshenko
Ukrainian People’s Bloc
Bloc Yuliya Tymoshenko

43.93
20.70
6.27
31.30
25.48
8.45
33.25

Bloc Our Ukraine

20.00

SPU
Bloc Yuliya Tymoshenko

14.69
44.54

Bloc Our Ukraine

11.63

SPU
Bloc Yuliya Tymoshenko

10.17
35.57

Bloc Our Ukraine

18.33

Party of Regions

9.99

Bloc Yuliya Tymoshenko

30.34

Bloc Our Ukraine

27.04

Party of Regions

12.72

Bloc Yuliya Tymoshenko

33.25

Bloc Our Ukraine
Party of Regions

19.39
10.92

Cherkasy

Bloc Yuliya Tymoshenko

38.25

Kyiv (city)

SPU
Bloc Our Ukraine
Bloc Yuliya Tymoshenko

13.39
12.18
39.22

Bloc Our Ukraine

15.84

Party of Regions
Bloc Yuliya Tymoshenko

11.76
33.90

Sumy

Chernihiv
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Zakarpattya

Zhytomyr

Poltava

Kirovohrad

Kherson

Dnipropetrovs’k

Mykolaiv

Odessa

Kharkiv

Zaporizhzhya

Autonomous Republic of Crimea

Sevastopol’

Luhans’k

Party of Regions
SPU
Bloc Our Ukraine
Bloc Yuliya Tymoshenko
Party of Regions
Bloc Yuliya Tymoshenko
Party of Regions
Bloc Our Ukraine
Bloc Yuliya Tymoshenko
Party of Regions
Bloc Our Ukraine
Bloc Yuliya Tymoshenko
Party of Regions
SPU
East and South
Party of Regions
Bloc Yuliya Tymoshenko
Bloc Our Ukraine
Party of Regions

39.14
17.43
9.75
44.98

Bloc Yuliya Tymoshenko

15.03

CPU
Party of Regions*
Bloc Yuliya Tymoshenko
Bloc Our Ukraine
Party of Regions
Bloc Yuliya Tymoshenko
Bloc Our Ukraine
Party of Regions*
Bloc Yuliya Tymoshenko
Bloc Our Ukraine
Party of Regions*

5.65
50.34
11.89
5.59
47.51
9.86
6.44
51.70
12.68
5.91
51.23

Bloc Yuliya Tymoshenko

10.94

Bloc Natalya Vitrenko
Party of Regions*
Bloc Our Ukraine
Bloc Yulia Tymoshenko
Party of Regions*
Bloc Natalya Vitrenko
CPU
Party of Regions*
Bloc Natalya Vitrenko

6.54
58.01
7.62
6.54
64.26
10.09
4.76
74.33
5.21

CPU

Donets’k

15.60
12.87
25.79
20.29
18.65
24.93
17.98
17.53
26.81
20.38
13.18
30.13
20.10
9.72

4.43

Party of Regions*
Bloc Natalya Vitrenko
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73.63
6.80

SPU

3.74

Bloc Yuliya Tymoshenko

417 Region Aggregate

13/17 regions

(west and Central)

10 Region Aggregate (East and South) | Party of Regions

10/10 regions

source: Central Election Commission of Ukraine
*penotes a party with over fifty percent of the vote

Key Electoral Blocs- 2006
Bloc Yuliya Tymoshenko

Bloc Our Ukraine

All-Ukrainian United Fatherland

People’s Union Our Ukraine
People’s Movement of Ukraine

Ukrainian Social Democratic Party

Congress of Ukrainian Nationalists
Christian Democratic Union
Ukrainian Republican Party Assembly

Party of Industrialists and Entrepreneurs of
Ukraine
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Appendix C: Emergency Rada Election- 2007
Winning Party by Oblast-2007

Region

Top Three Parties

Percentage of Votes

West and Central

Ternopil

Bloc Yuliya
Tymoshenko*
OU-PSDB**
Party of Regions

lvano-Frankivsk

Bloc Yuliya
Tymoshenko*
OU-PSDB
Party of Regions

Lviv

Bloc Yuliya

51.6
35.2
3.0

50.7
36.8
3.0

50.4

Tymoshenko*

OU-PSDB
Party of Regions

Volyn

Bloc Yuliya

36.0
4.2

57.6

Kyiv (Region)

Party of Regions
Bloc Yuliya
Tymoshenko*

6.7
51.0

OU-PSDB

20.8

Party of Regions
Bloc Yuliya

10.4
50.0

Tymoshenko*
OU-PSDB

18.6

Party of Regions

12.6

Bloc Yuliya

53.4

Tymoshenko*

Khmel’ntys’kyy

Chernivtsi

Sumy

Cherkasy

OU-PSDB

15.1

Party of Regions
Bloc Yuliya Tymoshenko |

13.0
48.2

OU-PSDB

18.4

Party of Regions
Bloc Yuliya Tymoshenko |

14.1
46.2

OU-PSDB

20.3

Party of Regions
Bloc Yuliya Tymoshenko |

16.8
44.5

OU-PSDB

20.8

Party of Regions
Bloc Yuliya Tymoshenko |
Party of Regions

15.7
47.0
15.5

Neanneeee

Vinnitsya

20.0
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ee

Rivne

OQU-PSDB

ee

Tymoshenko*

Kyiv (city)

Chernihiv

Zakarpattya

Zhytomyr

Poltava

Kirovohrad

OU-PSDB
Bloc Yuliya Tymoshenko
OU-PSDB
Party of Regions
Bloc Yuliya Tymoshenko
Party of Regions
OU-PSDB
OU-PSDB
Bloc Yuliya Tymoshenko
Party of Regions
Bloc Yuliya Tymoshenko
Party of Regions
OU-PSDB
Bloc Yuliya Tymoshenko

|

|

|
|

|

15.3
46.2
15.8
15.0
41.9
20.7
14.9
31.1
28.9
19.8
37.0
22.4
15.1
37.9

Party of Regions

24.8

OU-PSDB

14.5

Bloc Yuliya Tymoshenko |
Party of Regions

37.6
27.0

OU-PSDB

11.7

East and South

Kherson

Party of Regions
Bloc Yuliya Tymoshenko |
OU-PSDB/ CPU

43.2
23.1
9.1

Dnipropetrovs’k

Party of Regions
Bloc Yuliya Tymoshenko |

48.7
20.8

CPU
Party of Regions*

7.6
54.4

Bloc Yuliya Tymoshenko |

16.6

CPU

7.2

Party of Regions*
Bloc Yuliya Tymoshenko |

SPU
Kharkiv

7.2

Party of Regions
Bloc Yuliya Tymoshenko |

CPU
Zaporizhzhya

Party of Regions
Bloc Yuliya Tymoshenko |

Luhans’k

55.5
14.7

8.3

Party of Regions*

OU-PSDB
CPU
Sevastopol’

49.6
16.4

8.3

CPU
Autonomous Republic of Crimea

52.2
13.7

61.0

8.2
7.6

Party of Regions*

64.5

CPU

10.3

Bloc Yuliya Tymoshenko
Party of Regions*

5.0
73.5

CPU

8.5
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Odessa

eee
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Bloc Yulya Tymoshenko
Party of Regions*
CPU
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Tymoshenko
Agere

ate

tion
ntral Elec

East and South) | Party of Regions

5.1
76.0
6.8
4.5
16/17 regions
10/10 regions

aine
Com mission of Ukr

re of the votes
th fifty percent or mo
wi
ty
sndicates 4 par

69

eee

SS

oc
e’s Self Defense Bl

————

“Our Ukraine-PeoP!

References
Abdelal, Rawi. “Me
ay? mories of: Nations and States: | nstituti

i

and National
utional
Identity in Post-Soviet Eurasia.” Nationali ties Pape
rs 30,History
no. 3 (2002): 459-484

.
Anal
Arel, Dominique. “The ‘Orange Revolution’:
ysis and Implicati
ons of th e 2004
Presidential Election in Ukraine.” Paper Presented at
the Third Annual Stasiu
kCambridge Lecture on Contemporary U raine, Cambridge
University, February
25, 2005.
Aslund, Anders. “The Economic Policy of Ukraine after
the

Geography and Economics 46, no.5 (2005): 327-383.

Revolution.” Eurasian

.
Anders. “Ukraine’s Financial Crisis: 2009.” Eurasi,
Aslund, 50,
no.4 (2009): 371-386.
asian Geography and Economics
Bukkvoll, Tor. Ukraine and European Security. The Royal Instit

Affairs, 1997.

yal

:
Institute of International

Christensen, Robert K., Edward R. Rakhimkulov, and Charles
R. Wise. “The Ukrainian
Orange Revolution brought more than new president: What kind of democracy
3008),
207-230ional
.
will
the institut
changes bring?” Communist and Post-Communistnist Studi
Studies 38
D’Anieri, Paul. “What has changed in Ukrainian Politics? Assessing the Implications of

the Orange Revolution.” Problems of Post-Communism 52, no.5 (2005): 82-91.
Dimitrova, Antoaneta, and Rilka Dragneva. "Constraining external governance:
interdependence with Russia and the CIS as limits to the EU's rule transfer in the
Ukraine." Journal of European Public Policy 16, no. 6 (2009): 853-872.
Dos Santos, Raul Cristobau. “The Theory of Economic Development and NeoCompilation of Programas de Seminarios Academicos at the
Liberalism.”
University of Sao Paolo. 2004.

Duenwald, C., N. Gueorguiev, and A. Schaechter. Too much of a good thing? Credit Booms
in Transition Economies: The Cases of Bulgaria, Romania and Ukraine. Working
Paper 128, International Monetary Fund, 2005.

In The
Faith, Roger L. And James M. Buchanan. “Towards a Theory of Yes-No Voting.”
Press:
Michigan
of
y
(Universit
Buchanan
James
ed.
Theory of Public Choice: II,
1984): 90-104.

d Post-Orange
Flikke, Geir. “Pacts, Parties and Elite Struggle: Ukraine's Trouble
Transition.”

Europe-Asia Studies 60, no. 3 (2008): 375-396.

mon Market |
Comhood
Seer hbour
awrich, Andrea, Inna Melykovska, an d Rainer Schweicker t. “Neig
Gawri
e.
Ukrain
of
Case
Europeanization through ENP: The
Studies 48, no.5 (2010): 1209-1235.

References

Abdelal, Rawi. “Memories of Nations and States: Institutional History and National
Identity in Post-Soviet Eurasia.” Nationalities Papers 30, no. 3 (2002): 459-484.

Arel, Dominique. “The ‘Orange Revolution’: Analysis and Implications of the 2004
Presidential Election in Ukraine.” Paper presented at the Third Annual StasiukCambridge Lecture on Contemporary Ukraine, Cambridge University, February
25, 2005.
Aslund, Anders. “The Economic Policy of Ukraine after the Orange Revolution.” Eurasian

Geography and Economics 46, no.5 (2005): 327-353.
Aslund, Anders. “Ukraine’s Financial Crisis: 2009.” Eurasian Geography and Economics

50, no.4 (2009): 371-386.
Bukkvoll, Tor. Ukraine and European Security. The Royal Institute of International

Affairs, 1997.
Christensen, Robert K., Edward R. Rakhimkulov, and Charles R. Wise. “The Ukrainian
Orange Revolution brought more than new president: What kind of democracy
will the institutional changes bring?” Communist and Post-Communist Studies 38

(2005): 207-230.
D’Anieri, Paul. “What has changed in Ukrainian Politics? Assessing the Implications of
the Orange Revolution.” Problems of Post-Communism 52, no.5 (2005): 82-91.
Dimitrova, Antoaneta, and Rilka Dragneva. "Constraining external governance:
interdependence with Russia and the CIS as limits to the EU's rule transfer in the
Ukraine." Journal of European Public Policy 16, no. 6 (2009): 853-872.
Dos Santos, Raul Cristobau. “The Theory of Economic Development and NeoLiberalism.” Compilation of Programas de Seminarios Academicos at the
University of Sao Paolo. 2004.
Duenwald, C., N. Gueorguiev, and A. Schaechter. Too much ofa good thing? Credit Booms
in Transition Economies: The Cases of Bulgaria, Romania and Ukraine. Working
Paper 128, International Monetary Fund, 2005.
Faith, Roger L. And James M. Buchanan. “Towards a Theory of Yes-No Voting.” In The
Theory of Public Choice: II, ed. James Buchanan (University of Michigan Press:
1984): 90-104.
Flikke, Geir. “Pacts, Parties and Elite Struggle: Ukraine’s Troubled Post-Orange
Transition.” Europe-Asia Studies 60, no. 3 (2008): 375-396.
Gawrich, Andrea, Inna Melykovska, and Rainer Schweickert. “Neighbourhood

Europeanization through ENP: The Case of Ukraine.” Journal of Common Market
Studies 48, no.5 (2010): 1209-1235.

70

—

n, Erik S. “How Viktor Yanukovych Won: Reassessin g the Domi
Herro Ukraine’s 2010 Presidential Election.” East Europe an Politi nant Narratives of
cs and Societies 25

(2011): 47-67.

ik S. “The Parliamentary Election in Ukraine, September 2007.” Electoral
Herron, Eri
dies 27:3 (2008): 551-555.
political opposition: From
Karatnycky, Adrian. "The fall and rise of Ukraine’s
Kuchmagate to the Orange Revolution’." Revolution in Orange. Washington, DC:
Carnegie Endowment
for International Peace (2006): 29-44,
Karpyk, Tamila. “Transition Toward Democracy: Test of Democratization Theory in the

Cases of Ukraine and Poland.” Dalhousie EUCE Graduate Papers. 2009

Chudowsky. “Ukraine’s
1994 Elections as an Economic
Krave huk, Robert and Victor
.
.
Event.” Communist and Post-Communist Studies 38, no. 2 (2005): 131-165.
Kubicek, Paul. “Problems of Post-Post-Communism: Ukraine after the Orange

Revolution.”

Democratization 16, no.2 (2009): 323-343.

Kubicek, Paul. “The European Union and Democratization in Ukraine.” Communist and
Post-Communist Studies 38, no. 2 (2005): 269-292.
Kuzio, Taras. “From Kuchma to Yushchenko: Ukraine’s 2004 Presidential Elections and

the Orange Revolution.” Problems of Post-Communism 52, no.5 (2005): 29-44.
Kuzio, Taras. “Identity and Nation-Building in Ukraine: Defining the ‘Other’.” Ethnicities
(2001): 343-365.
Kuzio, Taras. "Russian policy toward ukraine during Elections."DEMOKRATIZATSIYAWASHINGTON- 13, no. 4 (2005): 491.
Kuzio, Taras and Andrew Wilson. Ukraine: From Perestroika to Independence. St.
Martin’s Press, 1994.

Light, Margot, Stephen White, and John Lowenhardt. “A Wider Europe: the View from
Moscow and Kyiv.” International Affairs 76, no.1 (2000): 77-88.

71

VE
TO

Myknenko, Vlad & Adam Swain 2009. “Ukraine’s Diverging Space-Economy: The Orange
Revolution, Post-Soviet Development Models, and Regional Trajectories.”
European Urban and Regional Studies.

TP
MR a ST Oe

Motyl, Alexander J. "The conceptual president: Leonid Kravchuk and the politics of
surrealism." Patterns in post-Soviet leadership (1995): 103-22.

AL ew

McFaul, Michael. “Ukraine Imports Democracy: External Influences on the Orange
Revolution.” International Security 32, no.2 (2007): 45-83.

>
Hara, Sat

ie, P

Pirie
Popo”

ah,

Artjoms Ivlevs, and Michael Gentile. “The Impact of Global Economic

Remittances in the Commonwealth of Independent States.” Eurasian

447-463.
and Economics 50, no.4(2009):

Identity and Politics in Southern and Eastern Ukraine.” East-Asia
.“N ational
1079-1104.
4 g, no. 7 (1996):
studies
ad
from
yaldimir. “Shock Therapy Versus Gradualism Reconsidered: Lessons
ansition

Economies after 15 Years of Reform.” Comparative Economic

(2007): 1-31.
Studies 49, 0-1

(Explaining
us Gradualism: The end of the Debate
“Shock Therapy Versona
y, Vladimir.itud
e of Transformati l Recession).” Comparative Economic Studies
Popo ‘the Magn

42, no.1 (2000): 1-57.

The History Of The Ukraine. Basic Books,
Reid, Anna. orderland: A Journey Through
2000.

aid for underdeveloped countries." The
Rosenstein-Rodan, Paul Narziss. "Internationalno. 2 (1961): 107-138.
of Economics and Statistics 43,
Review

1950s to the mid-1980s: The Second
Rusnachenko, Anatoliy. "Ukraine from the midIJA UN AUSTRUMEIROPA 20.
among Equals or a Colony of the Empire?." LATV
pp.195.
GADSIMTA 60.-80. GADOS (2007): 193.
E. Spiro, and Michael W. Doyle. "The
Russett, Bruce, Christopher Layne, David
4 (1995): 164-184.
democratic peace." International Security 19, no.

ne-EU Triangle:" zero-sum Game"
samokhvalov, Vsevolod. Relations in the Russia-Ukrai
es, 2007.
Or Not?. European Union Institute for Security Studi

rt for Political and Economic
Shulman, Stephen. “National Identity and Public Suppo
Reform in Ukraine.” Slavic Review 64 (2005): 59-87.
n Europe, and the
smith, Adrian and Adam Swain. “The Global Economic Crisis, Easter
ns of
Former Soviet Union: Models of Development and the Contradictio
(20 10): 1-34.
Internationalization.” Eurasian Geography and Economics 51, no.1
Smith, A. and Pickles, J. 2005. “Technologies of Transition: Foreign Investment and the

(re-) articulation of East Central Europe into the global economy” in Foreign

Direct Investment and Regional Development in East Cen tral Europe and the
Former Soviet Union, Turnock, D. (ed.), Aldershot: Ashgate

Swain, Adam 2006. “Soft Capitalism and a Hard Industry: Virtualism, the ‘Transition

Industry’, and the Restructuring of the Ukrainian Coal Industry.”
Swain, Adam, Vlad Myknenko, and Shaun French 2010. “The Corruption Industry and

Transition: Neoliberalizing Post-Soviet Space?”

72

Szporluk, Roman. “Ukraine: From An Imperial Periphery to a Sovereign State.” Daedalus

126, no.3 (1997): 85-120.
Van Zon, Hans. “Ethnic Conflict and Conflict Resolution in Ukraine.” Perspectives on

European Politics and Society 2, no.2 (2001): 222-240.
Van Zon, Hans. “Political Culture and Neo-Patrimonialism Under Leonid Kuchma.”

Problems of Post-Communism 52: 5 (2005): 12-22.
Wanner, Catherine. Burden of Dreams: History and Identity in Post-Soviet Ukraine. The
Pennsylvania State University Press, 1998.
Way, Lucan. “Authoritarian State Building and the Sources of Regime Competitiveness
In the

Fourth Wave: The Cases of Belarus, Moldova, Russia, and Ukraine.” World

Politics 57, no.2 (2005): 231-261.
Wolczuk, Kataryna. “History, Europe, and the ‘National Idea’: The ‘Official’ Narrative of

National Identity in Ukraine.” Nationalities Papers 28, no.4 (2000): 672-694.
Wolczuk, Kataryna. "Implementation without coordination: The impact of EU
conditionality on Ukraine under the European neighbourhood policy." Europe-

Asia Studies 61, no.2 (2009): 187-211.

Wolczuk, Kataryna. Integration without Europeanisation: Ukraine and its Policy towards
the European Union. Working Paper RSCAS 15, European University Institute,

2004.
Wolczuk, Kataryna. "Ukraine After the Orange Revolution.” Centre for European Reform,
February 2005 (2005).
Zagorski, Andrei. EU Policies Towards Russia, Ukraine, Moldova and Belarus. Geneva
Center for Security Policy, 2002.

Zhurzhenko, Tatiana. Borderlands into Bordered Lands: Geopolitics of Identity in PostSoviet

Ukraine. Ibidem, 2010.

73

